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Abusive Constitutionalism 
David Landau* 
This paper identifies an increasingly important phenomenon: the use of 
mechanisms of constitutional change to erode the democratic order. A rash 
of recent incidents in a diverse group of countries such as Hungary, Egypt, 
and Venezuela has shown that the tools of constitutional amendment and 
replacement can be used by would-be autocrats to undermine democracy 
with relative ease. Since military coups and other blatant ruptures in the 
constitutional order have fallen out of favor, actors instead rework the 
constitutional order with subtle changes in order to make themselves 
difficult to dislodge and to disable or pack courts and other accountability 
institutions. The resulting regimes continue to have elections and are not 
fully authoritarian, but they are significantly less democratic than they 
were previously. Even worse, the problem of abusive constitutionalism 
remains largely unresolved, since democratic defense mechanisms in both 
comparative constitutional law and international law are largely 
ineffective against it. Some of the mechanisms most relied upon in the 
literature — such as the German conception of militant democracy and 
the unconstitutional-constitutional amendments doctrine — are in fact 
either difficult to deploy against the threat of abusive constitutionalism or 
easily avoidable by would-be authoritarian actors. This Article suggests 
ways to reinforce democracy against these threats, while acknowledging 
the extreme difficulty of the task. The phenomenon of abusive 
constitutionalism should impact the conversation about how the fields of 
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comparative constitutional law and international law might best be 
leveraged to protect new democracies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the central questions in constitutional theory is how 
constitutions can be used to better protect against threats to the 
democratic order. This question has taken on new urgency since the 
Arab Spring, with a fresh wave of new, embattled democracies 
throughout the Middle East. This Article defines and grapples with an 
increasingly important phenomenon that I call abusive 
constitutionalism. Abusive constitutionalism involves the use of the 
mechanisms of constitutional change — constitutional amendment 
and constitutional replacement — to undermine democracy. While 
traditional methods of democratic overthrow such as the military coup 
have been on the decline for decades, the use of constitutional tools to 
create authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes is increasingly 
prevalent. Powerful incumbent presidents and parties can engineer 
constitutional change so as to make themselves very difficult to 
dislodge and so as to defuse institutions such as courts that are 
intended to check their exercises as power. The resulting constitutions 
still look democratic from a distance and contain many elements that 
are no different from those found in liberal democratic constitutions. 
But from close up they have been substantially reworked to undermine 
the democratic order. 
I draw off of recent examples from Hungary, Colombia, and 
Venezuela to illustrate the threat. But it is important to note that these 
examples only scratch the surface of what is an increasingly routine 
occurrence. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt recently 
used its dominating electoral power in the parliament, constituent 
assembly, and presidency, rather than extra-legal means, to craft a 
constitution that appears to be very favorable to its own interests.1 
Although the civilian government was since removed in a coup, 
commentators have argued that the constitution-making experience 
was designed to construct Egypt as a competitive authoritarian regime, 
where elections are held but the incumbent party is difficult to 
dislodge and relatively unchecked in its power.2 
 
 1 See David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 64 ALA. L. REV. 923, 971-
80 (2013) [hereinafter Constitution-Making] (summarizing and analyzing the Egyptian 
constitution-making process). 
 2 See, e.g., Abdullah Al-Arian, The Logic Behind Egypt’s New Authoritarianism, AL 
JAZEERA, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/12/2012124111437225259.html 
(last modified Dec. 5, 2012, 9:48 AM) (examining the constitution-making process in 
Egypt and arguing that it may lead to a “new authoritarianism” there); Zachary Laub, 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/africa/egypts-
muslim-brotherhood/p23991?cid=rss-middleeast-egypt_s_muslim_brotherhood-120312 
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Similarly, the phenomenon is showing up even in some countries 
generally considered stable liberal democracies. For example, the 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the leader of the traditionally 
dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), recently announced that he 
would pursue constitutional changes that would reduce the required 
majorities for constitutional change from two thirds of the Diet to only 
a simple majority.3 Since the LDP won massive legislative majorities in 
the last election, it will likely be able to push through this proposal. 
There is little risk that such a change will render Japan thoroughly 
undemocratic, but it does serve to erode democracy by allowing the 
powerful LDP to unilaterally push through any changes it might want. 
Such changes could obviously be used to increase the power of the 
LDP and to reduce the already-weak checks (such as the judiciary) on 
its power.4 
Constitutions have proven to be remarkably susceptible to these 
sorts of maneuvers. In countries outside of the United States, 
amendment thresholds are often set fairly low, allowing incumbents to 
round up sufficient support for sweeping changes with relative ease. 
Even where amendment thresholds are set higher, incumbent regimes 
can reach requisite legislative supermajorities with surprising 
frequency. And where constitutions cannot be amended in ways that 
would-be autocrats would like, these figures can often replace 
constitutional texts quite easily, as recently occurred in Hungary, 
Ecuador, and Venezuela. The set of formal rules found in constitutions 
is proving to be a mere parchment barrier against authoritarian and 
quasi-authoritarian regimes. 
There is even worse news: existing democracy-protecting 
mechanisms in international and comparative constitutional law have 
 
(last updated July 10, 2013) (noting the Muslim Brotherhood’s reliance on 
“majoritarianism” and the broad powers accorded to the president under the new 
constitution). 
 3 Lawrence Repeta, Get Ready for New Battles Over Japan’s Constitution, INT’L J. 
CONST. L. BLOG (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/02/get-ready-for-
new-battles-over-japans-constitution. 
 4 Scholars have long noted that the Japanese Supreme Court is a weak institution 
that does not carry out effective judicial review. The stock reason proceeds from the 
absence of political competition in the country — the dominant LDP party has had no 
reason to empower a court that would only check its power. See, e.g., David S. Law, 
Why Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1425, 1426-28 (2011) 
(accepting parts of this story while arguing that it is oversimplified); J. Mark 
Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 721, 722 (1994) (comparing the United States and Japanese Supreme Courts, 
and arguing that the lack of independence of the latter can be attributed to an absence 
of political competition). 
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proven ineffective against this new threat. Abusive constitutionalism is 
much harder to detect than traditional authoritarian threats. In 
international law, so-called “democracy clauses” often punish regimes 
that come to power through unconstitutional means. These clauses are 
effective at detecting traditional military coups, which are openly 
unconstitutional, but much less effective at detecting abusive 
constitutionalism, which uses means that are either constitutional or 
ambiguously constitutional. The recent experience in Honduras, for 
example, shows how these clauses fail to effectively combat abusive 
constitutionalism.5 In comparative constitutional law, the most 
important democracy-protecting mechanism, recently touted by 
Samuel Issacharoff, is the “militant democracy” conception created in 
post-war Germany, which allows for bans on anti-democratic parties 
(such as the Nazi party) before they have the chance to grow and gain 
power within the democratic order.6 This conception is again useful 
for staving off traditional authoritarian threats carried by obviously 
anti-democratic forces like the Nazis, but much less useful for 
contending with the more ambiguous, non-ideological threat posed by 
abusive constitutionalism. Abusive constitutionalism thus poses 
problems that are not being effectively combatted in either 
international law or domestic constitutional law. 
A more promising set of responses focuses on the design of 
mechanisms of constitutional change, particularly constitutional 
amendment rules. This model, which one might call “selective 
rigidity,” combines a low threshold for most amendments with 
selected blockage or higher thresholds for some kinds of change that 
are particularly likely to lead to abusive constitutionalism. For 
example, constitutional designers can use tiered constitutional 
provisions to make it more difficult to change sensitive structural 
provisions that are especially likely to be targeted by abusive 
constitutional efforts. Courts can also be given the power to strike 
down some proposed amendments that violate core principles of the 
constitutional order — this is the so-called “unconstitutional-
constitutional amendments doctrine,” which has been used to great 
 
 5 See generally Noah Feldman, David Landau, Brian Sheppard & Leonidas Rosa-
Suazo, Report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Honduras: Constitutional 
Issues (Fla. St. U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 536, 2011), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1915214 (examining both the 
abusive constitutionalism of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya and the questionable 
constitutionality of his removal from power). 
 6 See Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1408-09 
(2007) [hereinafter Democracies].  
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effect by courts in India, Turkey, and Colombia. These kinds of 
responses represent a state-of-the-art in constitutional theory. 
But scholars appear to have overstated the ability of these tools to 
prevent abusive constitutionalism. They may help stop some exercises, 
but they also contain weaknesses that limit their ability to serve as 
defense mechanisms for democracy. Tiered constitutional provisions, 
as currently designed, tend to serve an expressive function more than 
a practical one — the heightened amendment thresholds tend to 
protect provisions like human dignity, which are unlikely to be 
targeted by abusive constitutional regimes. And it is doubtful that 
constitutional designers could adequately write tiered provisions in a 
way that would protect all of the vulnerable elements of constitutional 
structure, at least without making the text unduly rigid. The 
unconstitutional-constitutional amendments doctrine can be deployed 
more flexibly, but this very flexibility can be problematic — in some 
cases, the doctrine appears to be interpreted far too broadly in order to 
cut off ordinary democratic politics, while in other cases courts are 
packed or threatened in ways that make the doctrine impossible to 
deploy. Further, the doctrine rests on a distinction between 
constitutional amendment (which is seen as susceptible to abuse) and 
constitutional replacement (which is seen as representing the 
authentic will of the people) that is belied by reality. Constitutional 
replacement, as well as amendment, can be and is used by would-be 
authoritarians to advance their agendas. 
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I define 
abusive constitutionalism, give recent examples of it in Colombia, 
Venezuela, and Hungary, and explain why constitutional tools are so 
effective at entrenching modern authoritarian regimes. Constitutional 
change allows authoritarian actors to remove members of the political 
opposition and to replace them with officials loyal to the incumbents; 
to weaken, disable, or pack courts as well as other mechanisms of 
accountability; and to establish government control over the media 
and other key institutions. Part II explains why existing tools in 
comparative constitutional law — the militant democracy conception 
made famous by German constitutionalism, tiered constitutional 
amendment thresholds, and the unconstitutional-constitutional 
amendments doctrine — appear to fail when confronted with abusive 
constitutionalism. Part III points out similar holes in democracy-
protection mechanisms in international law, and considers the 
prospects of emerging solutions like the recent call for an 
International Constitutional Court. Finally, I conclude by asking 
whether constitutional theory is capable of devising better solutions to 
the problem I have identified. The study of abusive constitutionalism 
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forms a research agenda that ought to command more attention from 
constitutional designers, and that may help inform key questions in 
constitutional theory — such as the nature of constitutionalism and 
the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy. 
I. DEFINING AND EXPLAINING ABUSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
In this Part, I define the practice of abusive constitutionalism and 
situate it within recent advances in both constitutional theory and 
regime theory, explaining why constitutionalism is now being used 
quite frequently to weaken democracy. In contrast to past practice, 
where authoritarian regimes were generally formed through military 
coup or other unconstitutional practices, would-be autocrats now have 
significant incentives to appear to be playing by the constitutional 
rules.7 Thus they are increasingly turning towards constitutional 
amendment and replacement as tools to help them construct a more 
authoritarian order. Then I give three examples drawn from recent 
experiences in Colombia, Venezuela, and Hungary, showing how 
powerful individuals and political parties can use the tools of 
constitutionalism to undermine it.8 The end result of these practices is 
not likely to be full-fledged authoritarianism, but rather a hybrid 
regime where elections continue to be held but opposition forces face 
severe disadvantages in seeking to win election. Finally, I synthesize 
the results of the case studies to explain why constitutionalism 
appears to be important to these various efforts.9 
A. Defining and Situating Abusive Constitutionalism 
I define “abusive constitutionalism” as the use of mechanisms of 
constitutional change in order to make a state significantly less 
democratic than it was before. In referring to the mechanisms of 
constitutional change, I focus here on formal rather than informal 
methods of change — constitutional amendment and constitutional 
replacement. In referring to maneuvers that make a regime 
“significantly less democratic,” I conceptualize democracy on a 
spectrum, acknowledging that there are various kinds of hybrid or 
competitive authoritarian regimes between full authoritarianism and 
full democracy.10 Finally, in referring to the degree of democracy in a 
 
 7 See infra Part I.A.  
 8 See infra Parts I.B–D.  
 9 See infra Part I.E. 
 10 See infra text accompanying notes 24–29. 
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given country, I focus on two distinct dimensions: (1) the electoral 
sphere and the extent to which incumbent and opposition figures 
compete on a level playing field, and (2) the extent to which the rights 
of individuals and minority groups are protected.11 Conceptually, 
these two dimensions are independent and could diverge, but in the 
regimes discussed here, backsliding in the electoral realm appears to 
be highly correlated with backsliding on rights questions. 
The biggest fear for those promoting democracy in the developing 
world has long been the military coup. In Latin America, alone, all but 
two major countries were under military dictatorship at some point in 
the 1960s and 1970s.12 Although in some cases military dictators 
might seek legal legitimation for their actions, military coups are 
ordinarily done in obvious defiance of the existing constitutional 
order.13 In Chile, for example, the military removed the civilian regime 
 
 11 The rights dimension is sometimes classified as the degree to which a regime is 
liberal, which is sometimes placed in opposition to democracy and at other times seen 
as “constitutive” of it. See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE 
THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 8 (1995). Given broad practical agreement on the 
desirability of rights protections within a state, I do not enter into that debate here. To 
be sure, these two dimensions may not exhaust the normative dimensions of 
democracy. We might, for example, define democracy with respect to participation as 
well, and some analysts of at least the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian regimes below have 
made claims that they represent a significant advance in the quality and extent of 
participation within those countries. See, e.g., Maxwell Cameron & Kenneth E. 
Sharpe, Andean Left Turns: Constituent Power and Constitution Making, in LATIN 
AMERICA’S LEFT TURNS: POLITICS, POLICIES, AND TRAJECTORIES OF CHANGE 61, 68 
(Maxwell A. Cameron & Eric Hershberg eds., 2010) (analyzing the community 
councils and recall referenda within the Venezuelan constitution, and contextualizing 
it within the “mobilization function” of Chavez’s project). There is no doubt that the 
Constitutions contain novel clauses, such as presidential recall provisions and 
provisions including civil society groups in judicial selection, that might be very 
useful as the basis for a more participatory democratic order. Whether in fact these 
provisions functioned to create a more participatory order is more contestable. See, 
e.g., ALLAN R. BREWER-CARÍAS, DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA: THE CHÁVEZ 
AUTHORITARIAN EXPERIMENT 227-30 (2010) (noting that the provisions allowing civil 
society groups to participate in the selection of Supreme Court justices were not 
implemented). 
 12 See, e.g., Guillermo O’Donnell, Introduction to the Latin American Cases, in 
TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: LATIN AMERICA 3, 5 (Guillermo O’Donnell et 
al. eds., 1986) (noting Venezuela and Colombia as exceptions). 
 13 Even in the classic form of military dictatorship, autocracy and 
constitutionalism are not as opposed as is often thought. Constitutionalism may be 
valuable for authoritarian regimes in helping to organize and formalize power, 
increase legitimacy, control subordinate officials, and attract foreign investment. See 
TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT 13-15 (2007) (showing how the Egyptian 
Constitutional Court was given considerable interpretative power over the 
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in 1973 by bombing and storming the presidential palace, closing the 
Congress, and suspending most parts of the existing constitution.14 
The country lived under no real constitutional order until 1980, when 
the military regime adopted a new text.15 
However, the number of coups has fallen sharply since their heyday 
in the 1960s.16 The end of the Cold War reduced the tolerance of 
powerful states for obviously non-democratic regimes, and it also 
shifted cultural norms at the international level towards recognition of 
the importance of democracy.17 Military involvement has become 
particularly disfavored, especially in regions such as Latin America 
with a long history of such involvement. Moreover, as noted in more 
detail in Part III, many regions have adopted so-called “democracy 
clauses,” punishing states that overthrow democratic regimes in 
flagrant violation of constitutional norms.18 This has pushed would-be 
autocrats towards more constitutional methods of change. Further, 
many of the coups that have happened recently have been less clearly 
anti-democratic than traditional military takeovers. Recent empirical 
research has shown that while Cold War era coups tended to end in 
long-running military dictatorships, more recent coups have tended to 
lead to rapid restorations of civilian rule.19 And as Ozan Varol has 
 
constitution in order to attract foreign investment and to control interpretations of 
Islamic provisions); Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg, Introduction: The Functions of 
Courts in Authoritarian Politics, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1, 4-11 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008) (laying 
out the reasons why authoritarian actors might establish judicial review and 
independent courts). 
 14 See Manuel Antonio Garretón, The Political Evolution of the Chilean Military 
Regime and Problems in the Transition to Democracy, in TRANSITIONS FROM 
AUTHORITARIAN RULE: LATIN AMERICA, supra note 12, at 95-98. 
 15 See id. at 109-10.  
 16 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Powell & Clayton L. Thyne, Global Instances of Coups 
from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset, 48 J. PEACE RES. 249, 255 (2011), available at 
http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/powell-thyne-JPR-2011.pdf (finding “a fairly clear 
decline in the total frequency of coup attempts over time,” although noting that the 
success rate has increased in the past ten years or so). 
 17 See, e.g., Susan Marks, What Has Become of the Emerging Right to Democratic 
Governance?, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 507, 511-12 (2011). 
 18 See Stephen J. Schnably, Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in the 
Inter-American System [hereinafter Constitutionalism], in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 155, 166-68 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) 
(exploring the role of the democracy clause and electoral monitoring within the 
Organization of American States); infra Part III.A. 
 19 See Nikolay Marinov & Heins Goemens, Coups and Democracy, 44 BRIT. J. POL. 
SCI. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 24), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2270631. 
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recently shown, some coups — such as the one ending military rule in 
Egypt — even have pro-democratic effects.20 Thus the 
unconstitutional coup, aside from being of declining significance, may 
also be overstated as a danger in the modern world. It is, at any rate, 
not the best basis for building modern constitutional design and 
theory. 
The alternative route of taking power constitutionally, and then 
using that power to overthrow democracy, is itself not a new idea. 
Indeed, perhaps the paradigm anti-canonical event around which 
modern comparative constitutional law was built — the Nazi 
overthrow of Weimar Germany — occurred using arguably 
constitutional means.21 In a terrible economic and unstable political 
environment, with a series of coalition governments falling in quick 
succession, the Nazis moved from a fringe party to a major movement. 
Hitler was appointed chancellor of a coalition government in 1933, 
and then convinced both the President and the Reichstag, itself, to 
give him the dictatorial powers he needed to create a totalitarian 
state.22 This nightmare of constitutionalism being used to destroy 
democracy informed much of post-war constitutional thought, 
including the concept of “militant democracy” that is considered in 
more detail in Part II.23 
Nonetheless, there are major differences between the Nazi takeover 
of Weimar Germany and the abusive constitutional tools considered in 
this Article. Most importantly, the Nazis replaced the Weimar 
Republic with a thoroughly authoritarian regime, thus using 
constitutionalism to completely destroy democracy. The existence of 
clearly authoritarian regimes has decreased through time, again largely 
because of the changes in the international environment surveyed 
above.24 Yet not of all these regimes have become fully democratic — 
 
 20 Ozan Varol, The Democratic Coup d’Etat, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 291, 294 (2012) 
(exploring coups in Portugal, Turkey, and Egypt that had pro-democratic effects, and 
noting that “some military coups are distinctly more democracy-promoting than 
others”). 
 21 See generally DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS 
KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR (1997) (noting that the Nazi takeover of the 
Weimar Republic occurred using legal means). 
 22 See, e.g., David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 YALE L.J. 548, 598 
(2009) (describing how the Nazis used their power within the government to 
“eliminate opposition and eventually repeal the entire Weimar constitution itself”); 
Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its 
Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1811 (2010) (noting the use of emergency powers by 
the Nazis in the Weimar Constitution). 
 23 See infra Part II.A.  
 24 For example, data from Freedom House shows that those regimes classified as 
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instead, many have become what political scientists call “competitive 
authoritarian,” “electoral autocracies,” or simply “hybrid” regimes, 
melding some aspects of democracy with some aspects of 
authoritarianism.25 
These regimes generally satisfy international actors in that they are 
sufficiently democratic to avoid sanctions and other consequences — 
elections are held, and they are not mere shams. There is enough 
electoral competition for opposition forces to compete and 
occasionally win.26 But at the same time, the deck is systematically 
stacked against those trying to unseat incumbents through a variety of 
means: government control of media, harassment of opposition 
politicians and operatives, use of state patronage resources to secure 
votes, and, in some cases, electoral fraud.27 As a result, incumbents 
currently in power tend to stay in power, and mechanisms of vertical 
accountability become distorted. 
 
“not free” have dropped steadily from forty-six percent of all countries in 1972 to 
twenty-four percent in 2012. During the same time period, the percentage of regimes 
classified as “partly free” — a reasonable proxy for the “hybrid regimes” discussed in this 
paper — has increased from twenty-five percent to thirty percent. See FREEDOM HOUSE, 
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2013, at 24 (2013), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ 
sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Charts%20and%20Graphs%20for%20Web.pdf. 
 25 See, e.g., STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM: 
HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR 5 (2010) (“Competitive authoritarian regimes 
are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely 
viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the 
state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents.”); Larry 
Diamond, Thinking About Hybrid Regimes, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2002, at 21-22 (noting 
that regimes like Russia, Venezuela, Turkey, and the Ukraine have elections, but yet 
did not appear to be truly democratic); Andreas Schedler, The Logic of Electoral 
Authoritarianism, in ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM: THE DYNAMICS OF UNFREE 
COMPETITION 1, 3-5 (Andreas Schedler ed., 2006) (coining and explaining the concept 
of “electoral authoritarianism”). There is also a related concept discussed by 
Guillermo O’Donnell, “delegative democracy,” where leaders are subject to vertical 
accountability via elections but not horizontal accountability via checks by courts or 
legislatures. See Guillermo O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1994, 
at 55-56. The “delegative democracy” concept, however, is different from the kind of 
regimes discussed here because it at least assumes a fair shot to periodically oust 
incumbents from office. 
 26 See LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 25, at 12 (noting that incumbents in 
competitive authoritarian regimes “fear a possible opposition victory” and must “work 
hard to thwart it”). 
 27 See id. (noting that “unfair competition” is the key element of the “competitive 
authoritarian” regime type, with opposition subject to “surveillance, harassment, and 
occasional violence” and with electoral and judicial authorities generally deployed 
against them rather than acting as neutral arbiters).  
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Moreover, in these regimes the dominant political actors and forces 
tend to control not only the branches of government, but also the 
mechanisms of horizontal accountability that are supposed to check 
political actors. Thus, institutions like courts, ombudsmen, attorney 
general’s offices, and electoral commissions all tend to be controlled 
by incumbents.28 Rather than serving as independent checks on 
government power, these institutions are actively working on behalf of 
their political projects. The result is not only to undermine electoral 
competition, but also to sharply limit the extent of protection of rights 
for minority groups within these systems. The core problem, then, is 
that it is fairly easy to construct a regime that looks democratic, but in 
actuality is not fully democratic, at least along two important 
dimensions: vertical and horizontal checks on elected leaders and 
rights protection for disempowered groups. A regime with these two 
characteristics — a relative absence of accountability and a lack of 
rights protection — is meaningfully less democratic than a regime 
with higher levels of vertical and horizontal accountability and more 
meaningful rights protection. Moreover, an absence of accountability 
is plausibly associated with other ills, like increased levels of 
corruption. In the examples below, I demonstrate how incumbent 
regimes in three countries — Colombia, Venezuela, and Hungary — 
have all attempted to use mechanisms of constitutional change to 
move towards such a regime.29 
B. Abusive Constitutionalism by Amendment: Colombia 
Colombia has historically maintained a semblance of democracy, 
largely by relying on regular elections and rotation in the presidency, 
with only a small number of historical exceptions. The country, for 
example, has had far fewer and shorter interludes of military 
authoritarianism then its neighbors.30 Also, historically, presidents 
have generally been limited to a single term in office, and this has 
 
 28 See id. at 27-28. 
 29 I am not claiming that manipulation of constitutional rules by powerful 
incumbents is a new phenomenon. Latin American constitutions, for example, have a 
long history of being manipulated for the gain of particular actors. See, e.g., Miguel 
Schor, Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Latin America, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
1, 4 (2006) (lamenting “[t]he ease with which constitutions can be changed or 
ignored” in Latin America). 
 30 See DAVID BUSHNELL, THE MAKING OF MODERN COLOMBIA: A NATION IN SPITE OF 
ITSELF 284-85 (1993). 
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helped to maintain the democratic order by preventing the emergence 
of strongmen with a continuous hold on the office.31 
However, President Alvaro Uribe Velez tested this paradigm after 
winning election in 2002. Like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, he won as 
an outsider, running against the traditional two-party system.32 He 
gained substantial popularity as a result of the perception that he was 
responsible for a marked drop in violence in the country,33 and he 
leveraged his popularity in order to push through an amendment to 
the Constitution allowing him a second term in office.34 The 
Colombian Constitution is fairly easy to amend, requiring only an 
absolute majority of Congress in two consecutive sessions, and Uribe 
was easily able to surpass this threshold.35 
A group of citizens challenged the law in front of the Colombian 
Constitutional Court, alleging that there were procedural irregularities 
and that the amendment constituted a “substitution of the 
Constitution” that could not be carried out by amendment, but instead 
only by a Constituent Assembly.36 On the second point, they 
emphasized that the design of the Constitution was set up for one-
term presidents, and that by holding more than one term Uribe would 
 
 31 See id. at 284.  
 32 See Kurt Weyland, Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: How Much 
Affinity?, 24 THIRD WORLD Q. 1095, 1111 (2003) (labeling Uribe a populist who won 
election outside of the traditional political party system). As in Venezuela, the 
country’s traditional party system had been losing legitimacy through time, 
particularly since the enactment of a new Constitution in 1991. See Eduardo Pizarro 
Leongómez, Giants with Feet of Clay: Political Parties in Colombia, in THE CRISIS OF 
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN THE ANDES 78, 78-79 (Scott Mainwaring et al. eds., 
2006). 
 33 See, e.g., Ann Mason, Colombia’s Democratic Security Agenda: Public Order in the 
Security Tripod, 26 SEC. DIALOGUE 391, 396-98 (2003) (explaining Uribe’s “democratic 
security” policy and its results in reducing guerrilla violence).  
 34 See Rodrigo Uprimny, The Recent Transformation of Constitutional Law in Latin 
America: Trends and Challenges, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1598 & n.76 (2011). 
 35 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 375 (requiring a simple 
majority of Congress in the first round and an absolute majority in the second round). 
 36 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Octubre 19, 2005, 
Sentencia C-1040/05, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.), available at 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2005/C-1040-05.htm. The substitution 
of the constitution doctrine holds that certain amendments are substantively 
unconstitutional because they effectively create a new constitution, rather than 
amending the existing one. These changes must be done through Constituent 
Assemblies and replacement of the constitution, rather than via amendment. See infra 
Part III.B (discussing the doctrine). See generally Carlos Bernal-Pulido, Unconstitutional 
Constitutional Amendments in the Case Study of Colombia: An Analysis of the Justification 
and Meaning of the Constitutional Replacement Doctrine, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 339 (2013) 
(examining relevant jurisprudence and developing a justification of the doctrine).  
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be allowed to appoint many of the officers who were responsible for 
checking him.37 They also noted that Uribe would face substantial 
electoral advantages because of his office, and thus would be difficult 
to dislodge. The Court responded that two-term presidencies were 
fairly normal internationally, that the extra four years would not allow 
him to capture all or most control institutions, and that special legal 
safeguards taken during the re-election campaign would help to 
ameliorate Uribe’s advantages.38 However, it also warned that the 
allowance of additional terms — beyond two — may well be 
unconstitutional, because the electoral advantages enjoyed by the 
incumbent would grow, and horizontal checks on his power would 
erode.39 
The Court was forced to face this situation four years later, after 
Uribe had won a second term. Supporters of the still-popular President 
worked to pass an amendment allowing a third term through 
Congress, and the Congress approved a referendum on whether three 
consecutive terms in office should be allowed.40 If given to the public, 
the referendum almost certainly would have passed, since Uribe 
continued to enjoy approval ratings well above sixty percent.41 The 
Constitutional Court was again faced with the problem of whether the 
amendment was constitutional, both procedurally and substantively 
— this time it struck it down on both grounds.42 Procedurally, the 
Court found problems with the financing of the initiative and with its 
passage through Congress. Substantively, it noted in detail the ways in 
which Uribe’s re-election would allow him to influence the selection of 
virtually all officials which were supposed to be checking him, and 
 
 37 Other institutions often have staggered terms so that no single president will be 
able to appoint all of them. For example, the national ombudsman (Defensor del 
Pueblo), General Prosecutor, and Public Ministry (Procuraduria) have four-year terms 
that are not coterminous with that of the President. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 
COLOMBIA [C.P.] arts. 249, 281. Justices of the Council of State, Supreme Court, and 
Constitutional Court have eight-year terms. See id. art. 233. 
 38 See C.C., Octubre 19, 2005, Sentencia C-1040/05, §§ 7.10.4.1–7.10.4.2, G.C.C. 
(Colom.). The amendment included a requirement that Congress pass a statutory law 
regulating the rights of the opposition, and in order to help ensure a level playing 
field. See L. 2/04, diciembre 28, 2004, DIARIO OFFICIAL [D.O.] No. 45.775 (Colom.). 
 39 See C.C., Sentencia C-1040/05, §§ 7.10.4.1–7.10.4.2. 
 40 See L. 1354/09, septiembre 8, 2009, D.O. No. 47.466 (Colom.). 
 41 See Popularidad de Alvaro Uribe cae 6 puntos y se ubica en 64 por ciento, su nivel 
mas bajo en 7 anos, EL TIEMPO (Colom.) (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.eltiempo.com/ 
archivo/documento/CMS-6527007http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-
6527007. 
 42 See C.C., febrero 26, 2010, Sentencia C-141/10, pt. VI, G.C.C. (Colom.), 
available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2010/c-141-10.htm. 
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thus would have “deep repercussions on the institutional design 
adopted by the Constituent Assembly.”43 Moreover, it noted that the 
advantages of incumbency would potentially grow over time, making 
Uribe increasingly difficult to dislodge from the presidency. In short, 
the Court held that the second re-election constituted a “substitution 
of the Constitution” because it would create such a strong presidency 
as to weaken democratic institutions.44 
The decision was complied with, and Uribe did not run for a third 
term.45 It is probably too much to say that the Court succeeded in 
preventing Colombia from becoming a competitive authoritarian 
regime; unlike Hugo Chavez in Venezuela or Rafael Correa in 
Ecuador, Uribe did not launch all-out attacks against most of the 
horizontal checks on his power, or threaten to remake the entire 
institutional order. Further, the Colombian regime contains a high 
number of relatively autonomous checking institutions, and it would 
not have been easy for Uribe to pack all of these institutions.46 But the 
Court probably did prevent a significant erosion of democracy by 
preventing a strong president from holding onto power indefinitely. 
C. Abusive Constitutionalism by Replacement: Venezuela 
President Hugo Chavez won an election in Venezuela in 1998 with 
fifty-six percent of the vote, running as an independent against the 
country’s traditional two-party system.47 The country had enjoyed a 
fairly strong two-party democracy for several decades, but, by the time 
Chavez was elected, the traditional two parties had lost support and 
were battling a series of corruption scandals.48 Still, Chavez faced 
 
 43 See id. §§ 6.3.6.1, 6.3.7 (explaining the influence that a twelve-year presidency 
would have on the Central Bank, Public Ministry, Constitutional Court, Prosecutor, 
and other institutions). 
 44 See id.  
 45 See Eduardo Posada-Carbó, Colombia After Uribe, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2011, at 
137. 
 46 See, e.g., David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative 
Constitutional Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 319, 338-39 (2010) (describing the role of the 
Constitutional Court and other institutions like the Ombudsman within the 
Colombian constitutional order). 
 47 See Michael Coppedge, Venezuela: Popular Sovereignty Versus Liberal 
Democracy, in CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 165, 167 
(Jorge I. Dominguez & Michael Shifter eds., 2nd ed. 2003). 
 48 The country had lived under a pacted two-party democracy for several decades, 
with the two major parties alternating power but excluding certain social groups — 
particularly on the right — from exercising political control. The system enjoyed 
substantial legitimacy for long periods of time, but, by the time Chavez was elected, 
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opposition from members of the two parties, who continued to control 
majorities in the national Congress, Supreme Court, state and local 
governments, and other institutions.49 With the opposition controlling 
most other institutions, Chavez was only weakly capable of carrying 
out his agenda. 
In order to neutralize this opposition, Chavez argued that the 
existing Constitution should and could be replaced. The existing 
Venezuelan Constitution provided only for amendment by Congress; 
like most texts it said nothing about its own replacement.50 But 
Chavez argued that the “people” retained an inherent constitutional 
power to replace their constitutional text, and proposed a referendum 
to determine whether elections for a Constituent Assembly should be 
held. The Supreme Court agreed with the proposal, noting that the 
public retained an “original constituent power” that was “prior and 
superior to the established judicial regime,” and thus had the power to 
replace their existing constitutional text.51 In subsequent cases, 
however, the Court vacillated in defining the powers possessed by the 
Assembly. It attempted to limit its power by holding that the Assembly 
was “bound to the spirit of the Constitution in force, and therefore . . . 
limited by the fundamental principles of the Democratic State of 
Law.”52 These limitations never proved effectual, though, because the 
 
had lost much of this due to economic crisis and because of a sense that the system 
was serving only the interests of insiders. See generally MICHAEL COPPEDGE, STRONG 
PARTIES AND LAME DUCKS: PRESIDENTIAL PARTYARCHY AND FACTIONALISM IN VENEZUELA 
(1994) (explaining how the Venezuelan “partyarchy” over time eroded the legitimacy 
of the regime).  
 49 See Coppedge, supra note 47, at 179 tbl.8.5 (showing that opposition group 
continued to hold 118 of 188 seats in the House and 67 of 100 seats in the Senate). 
 50 See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE VENEZUELA, arts. 245, 246 (1961). 
 51 See Caso. Junta Directiva de la Fundación para los Derechos Humanos, Corte 
Suprema de Justicia: Sala Político-Administrativa [Supreme Court of Justice: Political-
Administrative Chamber], 19 de Enero, 1999 (Venez.), reprinted in 77-80 REVISTA DE 
DERECHO PUBLICO 56, 56-57 (1999). 
 52 Caso. Gerardo Blyde Pérez, Corte Suprema de Justicia: Sala Político-
Administrativa [Supreme Court of Justice: Political-Administrative Chamber], 23 de 
Marzo, 1999 (Venez.), available in 77-80 REVISTA DEL DERECHO PUBLICO 83, 84 (1999). 
This language was used in a clarification of a ruling in an earlier case in which the 
Court struck down the referendum questions formulated by Chavez. The second 
question asked the public to vote on the convocation of a Constituent Assembly under 
electoral rules that would subsequently be formulated by him. See Caso. Gerardo 
Blyde, contra la Resolucion No 990217-32 del Consejo Nacional Electoral (17-2-99), 
Corte Suprema de Justicia: Sala Político-Administrativa [Supreme Court of Justice: 
Political-Administrative Chamber], 18 de Marzo, 1999 (Venez.), reprinted in 77-80 
REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO 73, 78-82 (1999). The Court held that this formula was 
unconstitutional, because it would not guarantee that the Assembly would represent 
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Court never used them to strike down an important act of Chavez or 
of the Assembly.53 Once the Assembly had been actually convoked, the 
Court would revert to its position that the Assembly was invested with 
“original constituent power,” and thus could not be controlled by 
existing institutions of state.54 
Thus, Chavez wrote the rules for the election to the Assembly on his 
own, and managed to engineer a set of electoral rules that were 
immensely favorable to him: his party won sixty percent of votes, but 
took over ninety percent of seats in the Assembly overall.55 Once 
convoked, the Assembly focused on shutting down institutions still 
controlled by the old two-party system: it suspended the Congress, 
created a Council charged with purging the judiciary, removed state-
level officials, and eventually closed the Supreme Court itself.56 Some 
of these actions were challenged in front of the Supreme Court, but 
applying the “original constituent power” doctrine, it refused to step 
in.57 Further, the new Constitution promulgated by Chavez abolished 
 
“the true popular will.” Id. at 80. 
 53 The Court struck down symbolic measures, like one that defined the Assembly 
as “an original power that carries popular sovereignty.” See Caso. Gerardo Blyde vs. 
Consejo Supremo Electoral, Corte Suprema de Justicia: Sala Político-Administrativa 
[Supreme Court of Justice: Political-Administrative Chamber], 13 de Abril, 1999 
(Venez.), reprinted in 77-80 REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO 85, 85 (1999). In another 
case, the Court held that statements made by Chavez on television failed to make clear 
that the Assembly was subject to control by the existing constitutional order. See 
Caso. Alberto Franceschi y Otros, Corte Suprema de Justicia: Sala Político-
Administrativa [Supreme Court of Justice: Political-Administrative Chamber], 21 de 
Julio, 1999, (Venez.), reprinted in 77-80 REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO 104, 106, 110 
(1999). 
 54 See Caso. Vicepresidente del Congreso de la República vs. Asamblea (decreto 
25-8-99), Corte Suprema de Justicia: Sala Plena [Supreme Court of Justice: Plenary 
Session], 14 de Octubre, 1999, (Venez.), reprinted in 77-80 REVISTA DE DERECHO 
PUBLICO 111, 111 (1999). 
 55 Renata Segura & Ana María Bejarano, ¡Ni una asemblea más sin nosotros! 
Exclusion, Inclusion, and the Politics of Constitution-Making in the Andes, 11 
CONSTELLATIONS 218, 225, 228-30 (2004). 
 56 As a prelude to these actions, Chavez placed his mandate at the disposal of the 
Assembly, stating that it had the power to remove him from his post if it wished, since 
it possessed sovereignty over all institutions of state. The surprised Assembly debated 
the motion and “ratified” Chavez as president with zero “no” votes and three 
abstentions. See Gaceta Constitucional, No. 5, August 9, 1999.  
 57 The closure of Congress was challenged in front of the Supreme Court, but the 
full court refused to declare the action unconstitutional. See Caso. Vicepresidente del 
Congreso de la República, reprinted in 77-80 REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, at 120. As 
the prominent Venezuelan legal scholar Allan Brewer-Carias noted, by so ruling the 
Court essentially signed its own “death sentence,” paving the way for the abolition of 
all other institutions that existed under the old order. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, La 
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the single four-year presidential term-limit found in the existing 
constitution and replaced it with an allowance of two terms of six 
years each, effectively allowing Chavez to stay in power for twelve 
more years.58 It also greatly increased executive power, turning what 
had been one of the weakest presidents in Latin America into one of 
the strongest in the region.59 The entire constitution-making process 
was completed in a span of only a few months, and since Chavez 
controlled the Assembly, there was virtually no debate on most 
provisions.60 
The 1999 constitution-making process thus gave Chavez a legal 
means to sweep the deck clean, removing opposition figures from 
power and replacing them with institutions that he could control. In 
that sense, it helped to shepherd in a competitive authoritarian regime, 
where Chavez maintained power continuously until his death in 2013 
and was able to control most other institutions in the country. He had 
subsequently been able to use his power over the state to push 
through other constitutional amendments that increased his power, 
such as a 2009 package that removed term limits entirely.61 
This tactic — replacing an existing constitution as a way to 
consolidate power — has spread beyond Chavez to a variety of other 
regimes in Latin America. Both Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Evo 
Morales in Bolivia similarly relied on constitutional replacement as a 
way to sweep away horizontal checks on their power and to 
consolidate competitive authoritarian regimes.62 And as explored in 
 
Configuración Judicial del Proceso Constituyente en Venezeual de 1999: O de Cómo el 
Guárdian de la Constitución Abrió el Camino Para Su Violación y Para su Propia 
Extinción, reprinted in 77-80 REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO 453, 502 (1999). 
 58 See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, art. 230. (1999). 
 59 See Katja S. Newman, Constitutional Coups: Advancing Executive Power in 
Latin American Democracies 27-29 (May 7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author), available at http://www.democracy.uci.edu/files/democracy/docs/ 
conferences/grad/2011/Newman%20CSD%202011%20Grad%20Conf%20CONSTITUT
IONAL%20COUPS.pdf (finding based on an index that presidential power was 
increased by 121%). 
 60 See Landau, Constitution-Making, supra note 1, at 941-49 (describing the 
constitution-making process in Venezuela). 
 61 See, e.g., Allan R. Brewer-Carías, Venezuela 2009 Referendum on Continuous 
Reelection: Constitutional Implications 4 (Feb. 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author), available at http://ilas.columbia.edu/images/uploads/ 
workingpapers/Allan_Brewer-Carias-_Venezuela_2009_Referendum_on_Continuous_ 
Re-Election,_Constitutional_Implications.pdf (noting that the National Assembly used 
the Constitutional Amendment procedure to “establish the possibility for the 
indefinite and continuous reelection of the President of the Republic”). 
 62 See, e.g., Landau, Constitution-Making, supra note 1, at 949-58 (describing 
constitutional replacement in Bolivia). 
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more detail below, Manuel Zelaya attempted to pursue a similar tactic 
in Honduras before he was removed from power.63 
The Ecuadorian case, for example, is illustrative of the same basic 
strategy as the one used by Chavez in Venezuela. President Rafael 
Correa won election as an outsider to another discredited political 
system with fifty-two percent of the vote, and his movement ran 
against the system to such an extent that it did not seek any 
congressional seats.64 Once elected, Correa threatened the Congress 
with dissolution, and proposed a referendum that would achieve that 
goal and would also call a new Constituent Assembly to replace the 
existing Constitution. Congress, faced with this pressure, caved, and 
by majority vote allowed a referendum on whether a Constituent 
Assembly should be called.65 Correa, however, then unilaterally 
changed the terms of the referendum to include additional provisions, 
such as one calling for the immediate dissolution of the Congress. 
When Congress responded by beginning impeachment proceedings 
against the President, he had the Supreme Electoral Tribunal — which 
he controlled — remove fifty-seven members of Congress.66 
As in Venezuela, the resulting constitutional text created a much 
stronger presidency.67 As importantly, it gave Correa an opportunity to 
pack all of the various institutions (including the Congress and 
Constitutional Court) that would have checked his power. The result 
is another competitive authoritarian regime; Ecuador continues to 
hold elections, but the opposition is now facing a playing field that is 
strongly tilted against it.68 
 
 63 See infra Part III.A. 
 64 See Agustín Grijalva, Courts and Political Parties: The Politics of Constitutional 
Review in Ecuador 151-52 (April 14, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Pittsburgh) (on file with author), available at http://d-scholarship.pitt. 
edu/7334/1/grijalva_agustin_2010_etd.pdf. 
 65 See Catherine M. Conaghan, Ecuador: Correa’s Plebiscitary Presidency, J. 
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2008, at 51. 
 66 See id. at 52. Moreover, when the Constitutional Tribunal attempted to 
intervene on behalf of the removed Congressmen, the new Congress — which Correa 
controlled — simply removed the justices by claiming that their terms had expired. 
See Grijalva, supra note 64, at 153. 
 67 See Newman, supra note 59, at 27-28. 
 68 Steven Levitsky & James Loxton, Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in 
the Andes, 20 DEMOCRATIZATION 107, 121 (2013). Conaghan instead refers to Ecuador 
as a “plebiscitary” democracy, explaining how Correa succeeded in weakening all 
other branches of government and governing by taking his case directly to the people. 
See Conaghan, supra note 65, at 47-48. Regardless of label, however, Correa’s actions 
have weakened democracy in a particular way. 
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D. A Combination of Reform and Replacement: Hungary 
In Hungary, the Fidesz Party won the Parliamentary elections of 
2010 with fifty-three percent of the vote. They ousted the previously 
governing Socialists, who had presided over a deteriorating economy. 
However, because of the way that the Hungarian voting rules worked, 
the fifty-three percent of the vote translated into sixty-eight percent of 
the seats, a sufficient supermajority to amend the existing 
Constitution.69 The Fidesz Party has had a checkered and 
opportunistic ideological past: it began as a Libertarian party after the 
transition from Communism, but became a Conservative party after 
suffering early electoral defeats.70 
Although the Fidesz Party had not campaigned on a platform of 
constitutional change, it began moving towards radical constitutional 
reform after winning the 2010 election. It first enacted a series of 
constitutional amendments — ten in the closing months of 2010 — 
that weakened institutions serving to check parliamentary majorities, 
particularly the Constitutional Court.71 The Parliament reformed the 
Constitution to give Fidesz members more unilateral power over the 
nomination process, and after the Court struck down a retroactive tax 
on bonuses received by departing civil servants, the Parliament 
responded by passing a constitutional amendment stripping most of 
the Court’s jurisdiction over fiscal and budgetary matters.72 The Court 
was asked to strike down this amendment on the ground that it was 
substantively unconstitutional because it was severely at variance with 
the existing constitutional order, but a majority of the Court declined 
to adopt that doctrine and held that it could only review constitutional 
amendments for procedural problems.73 
 
 69 The voting rules in place gave majoritarian boosts to the party gaining a 
plurality of votes, thus helping the Fidesz gain extra seats. See Miklós Bánkuti et al., 
Disabling the Constitution, J. DEMOCRACY, July 2012, at 139. 
 70 See, e.g., Csilla Kiss, From Liberalism to Conservatism: The Federation of Young 
Democrats in Post-Communist Hungary, 16 E. EUR. POL. & SOC’Y 739, 741-44 (2002) 
(tracing the ideological shifts in the Fidesz). 
 71 The Parliament also passed a number of laws that had important effects on the 
democratic order. For example, a set of media laws concerned critics, as they 
potentially reduced the independence of media outlets. See, e.g., Judy Dempsey, 
Hungary Waves off Criticism Over Media Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/world/europe/26hungary.html?_r=0. 
 72 See Gábor Halmai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: Constitutional 
Courts as Guardians of the Constitution?, 19 CONSTELLATIONS 182, 191-92 (2012). 
 73 See id. at 195-96. The majority of the Court suggested that there were 
immutable parts of the constitutional order, but held that it was beyond its power to 
actually enforce those limits.  
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The Fidesz majority then went forward with a plan for 
constitutional replacement — using its two-thirds majority in 
Parliament, it began writing an entirely new text.74 The process was 
widely criticized for not being inclusive; the party used a 
parliamentary device to evade most deliberation on the bill, and 
almost no input was received from opposition political forces.75 As in 
the Venezuelan case, the new Constitution both undermines 
horizontal checks on the majority and may help it to perpetuate itself 
in power indefinitely. The new Constitution expands the size of the 
Constitutional Court, thus giving the ruling party additional seats to 
fill.76 It also creates a new National Judicial Office, controlled by the 
party, and one with broad powers over both judicial selection and the 
assignment of cases within the ordinary judiciary.77 The judicial 
 
 74 Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making in Hungary: After Success, 
Partial Failure, and Now What?, 26 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 19, 43 (2010). The Hungarian 
constitutional situation was peculiar; the country never wrote a new constitution 
when it transitioned to democracy, but instead maintained the old, Communist-era 
constitution with massive amendments. The old Constitution thus openly 
contemplated its replacement, but no such replacement materialized during the first 
twenty years of the democratic regime. See id. at 27-28 (exploring why no permanent 
constitution was ever enacted). The Fidesz also used its two-thirds majority to amend 
a part of the old Constitution, which had probably already ceased to have any effect, 
requiring approval of four-fifths of Parliament in order to “establish the rules and 
procedures for the preparation of a new Constitution.” See A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG 
ALKOTMÁNYA [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY] (1995), art. 24, cl. 5 
(stating that the four-fifths requirement would expire when the Parliament elected in 
1994 ended). But see Andew Arato, Arato on Constitution-Making in Hungary and the 
4/5ths Rule, COMP. CONSTS. BLOG (Apr. 6, 2012, 7:19 AM), http://www. 
comparativeconstitutions.org/2011/04/arato-on-constitution-making-in-hungary.html 
(arguing that the four-fifths rule might still have life). 
 75 See EUR. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMM’N), Opinion on 
Three Legal Questions Arising in the Process of Drafting the New Constitution, 86th Sess., 
Op. No. 614/2011, at 4-5 (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/ 
documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2011)001-e (raising concerns about the lack of opposition 
participation in the process, the lack of transparency, and the tight time-frame within 
which the Constitution was being drafted). 
 76 See MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY] 
[CONSTITUTION] (2011), art. 24, § 4 (expanding the size of the Court from eleven to 
fifteen members). 
 77 Note that the National Judicial Office was created and defined by a cardinal law, 
rather than by the Constitution. The Constitution required the creation of cardinal 
laws to govern various areas, and the Constitution requires a two-thirds majority to 
either write or amend these cardinal laws. Id. art. T, § 4; see also EUR. COMM’N FOR 
DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMM’N), Opinion on Act CLXII of 2011 on the Legal 
Status and Remuneration of Judges and Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation and 
Administration of Courts of Hungary, 90th Sess., Op. No. 663/2012, at 7-8 (Mar. 19, 
2012), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2012)001-e 
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retirement age was reduced from seventy to sixty-two, giving the 
National Judicial Office a large number of vacancies to fill in a short 
period of time.78 Other key institutions, like the Electoral 
Commission, Budget Commission, and Media Board, have been re-
staffed with Fidesz loyalists and often given very long terms of twelve 
years.79 Finally, new rules adjust the electoral districts in ways that 
would have substantially increased their share of the vote in each of 
the past three elections, thus potentially making the Fidesz harder to 
dislodge in the future.80 
This effort has provoked some responses both domestically and 
internationally. Domestically, the Constitutional Court for the time-
being retains sufficient independence to issue some important rulings 
against the regime. For example, the Court struck down the effort to 
lower the retirement age to sixty-two, although it issued a weak 
remedy that appeared to have no effect on the judges already removed 
from the bench.81 It also struck down a new voter-registration law that 
seemed designed to further tilt the electoral balance in the Fidesz’s 
 
(expressing concerns about the institution). 
 78 EUR. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION), Opinion on the 
New Constitution of Hungary, Op. No. 621/2011, at 22 (June 20, 2011), 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2011)016-e [hereinafter 
New Constitution of Hungary] (expressing concern over this development because it 
“may undermine the operational capacity of the courts and affect continuity and legal 
security and might also open the way for undue influence on the composition of the 
judiciary”). 
 79 See, e.g., Bánkuti et al., supra note 69, at 140-44 (explaining how these 
institutions were packed). Yet other institutions, like the National Ombudsman’s 
Office, were greatly weakened. Id. at 144. 
 80 For an analysis of the new electoral districts, see, for example, Viktor Szigetvári 
et al., Beyond Democracy — The Model of the New Hungarian Parliamentary 
Electoral System 1, 12-13 (Nov. 24, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author), available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/Beyond% 
20democracy%20-%2027%20Nov%202011.pdf (finding that the Fidesz would have 
won each of the last three elections, including two that it actually lost, if the new 
electoral districts had been in place). 
 81 See Kim Lane Scheppele, How to Evade the Constitution: The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court’s Decision on Retirement Age, VERFASSUNGS BLOG (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/how-to-evade-the-constitution-the-hungarian-
constitutional-courts-decision-on-judicial-retirement-age-part-i/#.UQiH2Wfiv3U 
(noting that judicial reinstatement was now winding its way through the ordinary 
judiciary with no certainty of success, and that the newly appointed judges would not 
be removed at any rate). Note that the European Court of Justice later issued a 
decision striking down the same move as age discrimination which was not 
proportionate to the achievement of any legitimate social policy. See Case C-286/12, 
Comm’n v. Hungary, 2012 CELEX WL 612CJ0286 (Nov. 6, 2012). 
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favor.82 Internationally, various institutions of the European Union 
and the Council of Europe have searched for an appropriate response. 
The Venice Commission, created to give constitutional assistance to 
the transitional democracies in Eastern Europe, has criticized certain 
parts of the new text and related laws,83 while enforcement 
proceedings were brought against certain elements of the program, 
especially those that reduced the independence of the Central Bank 
and lowered the retirement age for judges to sixty-two.84 In response, 
the Fidesz has modified some of its policies.85 
We do not know whether the result of the Hungarian case will be 
the creation of a competitive authoritarian regime, but the intent was 
clearly to move in that direction. It may be difficult for a member of 
the European Union to move too far in the direction of 
authoritarianism, although it is startling how successful the Fidesz has 
been in carrying out this goal within a short period of time. 
E. Abusive Constitutionalism and Modern Authoritarianism 
Why is it that constitutionalism, which is normally associated with 
the rise and consolidation of democratic regimes, is in these cases so 
strongly associated with moves towards competitive authoritarian or 
hybrid regimes? Scholars have doubted the value of constitutional 
rules to the competitive authoritarian project. For example, political 
scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way argue that formal rules are 
relatively unimportant to competitive authoritarian regimes because 
these regimes tend to rely on informal sets of norms to perpetuate 
 
 82 Margit Feher, Hungary Court Throws out Mandatory Voter Registration, WALL ST. 
J. EMERGING EUR. BLOG (Jan. 4, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/ 
2013/01/04/hungary-court-throws-out-mandatory-voter-registration/. 
 83 See EUR. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMM’N), New 
Constitution of Hungary, supra note 78, at 28-29 (giving a balanced assessment of the 
new constitution, praising certain elements while expressing serious concern about 
the reforms to the judiciary and certain other elements). 
 84 See sources cited supra note 81 (explaining the European Court of Justice case 
striking down the lowered mandatory retirement age for judges); see also EU Opens 
Legal Action Against Hungary Over New Laws, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/world-europe-16593827 (last updated Jan. 17, 2012, 10:40 AM). 
 85 See, e.g., Andrew Clapham, Council of Europe Cites Hungary’s Progress on 
Judiciary, Media, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 29, 2013, 4:49 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2013-01-29/council-of-europe-cites-hungary-s-progress-on-judiciary-media.html 
(noting amendments to the laws in both areas in light of discussions with European 
officials); EU Closes Central Bank Infringement Case, EUBUSINESS.COM (July 19, 2012, 
3:46 PM), http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/hungary-economy.ht0/ (stating that 
amendments to the Central Bank law had allayed the concerns of the European 
Commission). 
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themselves in power.86 They argue that in these kinds of regimes, the 
formal rules “designed to constrain governments [are] frequently 
circumvented, manipulated, or dismantled.”87 As an example, 
competitive authoritarian regimes tend to possess democratic-looking 
constitutions with structural features such as the separation of powers, 
but take informal measures to neutralize the value of those checks. 
Rulers can appoint friendly judges to courts, and can neutralize judges 
representing opposing interests by, for example, bribing them or 
threatening them. Similarly, these regimes might hold elections, and 
because of monitoring and other incentives, might avoid blatant fraud 
on election day itself. But they rely on state control over the media and 
over the largesse of state resources, as well as intimidation and 
harassment of opposition figures, to nonetheless make incumbents 
very difficult to dislodge.88 There is no doubt, then, that these regimes 
do rest largely on informal sets of norms and incentives. 
Yet the examples given above, as well as other examples drawn upon 
by scholars, offer ample evidence that constitutionalism is often a key 
part of these projects.89 It is a mistake to ignore the importance of 
formal constitutional rules to hybrid regimes. For one thing, formal 
constitutional rules define incumbents’ tenure in office, power over 
other institutions, and other variables. Thus in Colombia, Uribe’s 
ability to leverage informal mechanisms, such as patronage, to control 
other institutions of state, like courts and ombudsmen, was dependent 
on his ability to remain in office indefinitely, and thus he continuously 
sought constitutional reform in order to allow presidential re-
election.90 In Venezuela and Ecuador, the new constitutions 
strengthened the presidents’ power considerably, giving incumbent 
executives power to legislate around existing institutions.91 And in 
 
 86 See LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 25, at 78-81 (arguing that “there is reason to be 
skeptical about the impact of the institutional design in competitive authoritarian 
regimes”). 
 87 Id. at 79. 
 88 See William Case, Manipulative Skills: How Do Rulers Control the Electoral 
Arena?, in ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM, supra note 25, at 95, 99-104 (listing 
techniques for controlling elections that generally fall short of election-day fraud). 
 89 For other examples of the use of constitutionalism in the construction of 
weakly democratic regimes, see, for example, Landau, Constitution-Making, supra note 
1, at 938-39 (examining this phenomenon in Bolivia, Venezuela, and perhaps now 
Egypt); William Partlett, The Dangers of Popular Constitution-Making, 38 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 193, 209-33 (2012) (discussing Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and other post-
Soviet countries). 
 90 See supra text accompanying note 36. 
 91 See supra notes 59, 67 (noting the increase in executive power in both 
Venezuela and Ecuador). 
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Hungary, the new constitutional order weakened or disabled some of 
the checking institutions, giving the Fidesz more power.92 
Moreover, constitutional change can be used to either dismantle or 
pack institutions serving as strongholds for the opposition. The 
weakening or removal of opposition figures is instrumental to the 
construction of competitive authoritarian regimes because it gives 
incumbents a greatly increased power to rework the state to their 
advantage. The examples described above show that constitutional 
replacement can be a particularly efficient way for political actors to 
entrench themselves in power and to overcome political opposition, 
and thus is likely more dangerous than constitutional amendment. 
First and foremost, constitutional replacement gives dominant actors a 
chance to sweep away the power bases of opposition groups. Chavez 
in Venezuela, Correa in Ecuador, and the Fidesz in Hungary all gained 
control over a core branch or branches of government by winning 
elections, but they did not have initial control over the entire state. 
Key institutions, such as legislatures (in the presidential system), 
courts, ombudsmen, electoral tribunals, and state and local officials 
(in federal Venezuela) remained outside of their grasp. 
Rewriting the constitution gave these would-be authoritarian actors 
a chance to weaken or remove some of these institutions and to pack 
others. By shifting from one constitutional order to another, rulers 
could argue that existing office-holders in these institutions no longer 
held a valid grip on power and could legitimately be replaced, a 
technique that Chavez and his Constituent Assembly used extensively 
in Venezuela.93 They could also change the size of existing 
institutions, as the Fidesz did with the Constitutional Court in 
Hungary.94 Or they could close down existing institutions entirely and 
create new ones with weaker powers. The trick, as well, is that 
packing or dismantling a single institution will rarely have serious 
consequences for democracy, but sweeping away large parts of the 
institutional order — as was done in all of these cases — may allow 
rulers to entrench themselves in power for long periods of time. 
In short, constitutional change needs to be viewed as a core part of 
modern authoritarian projects. Powerful individuals or groups can 
abuse constitution-making to create constitutional orders in which 
they face few constraints on their power and in which they will be 
difficult or impossible to dislodge. This new construction of formal 
 
 92 See supra text accompanying notes 71–82. 
 93 See supra text accompanying notes 56–57. 
 94 See supra note 76.  
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rules works in tandem with informal norms such as bribery and 
harassment within competitive authoritarian regimes. 
One could respond by saying that abusive constitutionalism is 
simply an act of normal constitutionalism, and thus not a real cause 
for concern. Constitutional orders should be open to change for 
various reasons, including technological and social change, or simply 
deep-rooted shifts in the values and interests of a population.95 Yet 
there are several reasons why the kinds of changes involved here are 
particularly dangerous. First, they appear to weaken the degree to 
which a regime is democratic over long periods of time. Constitutional 
change of this type weakens institutions and allows the construction 
of an uneven playing field, whereby incumbents enjoy large electoral 
advantages over their opponents. It seems likely that these effects 
persist even after the original incumbent at issue has been ousted.96 
Second, the identification of abusive constitutional change with any 
kind of enduring popular will is problematic. Incumbents capitalize on 
transient surges in their popularity to push through changes that 
impact the democratic order. They also manipulate electoral law and 
other mechanisms to inflate their support. In Hungary, for example, 
the Fidesz won only fifty-three percent of the vote, but sixty-eight 
percent of the seats because of a set of electoral rules that were 
designed to encourage majoritarian governance by rewarding winning 
parties with additional seats.97 The party’s approval rating has since 
dropped sharply, although it would still win hypothetical pluralities 
against other parties.98 This did not represent a durable mandate for 
 
 95 See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative 
Perspective, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96, 97-102 (Tom Ginsburg & 
Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (explaining the various purposes behind constitutional 
amendment rules). 
 96 As an example, one might consider Russia, where then-President Boris Yeltsin 
was able to take the constitution-making process out of the elected Parliament and 
into a handpicked special Assembly after winning a popular referendum. See Partlett, 
supra note 89, at 210-26 (explaining the Russian constitution-making process and 
how it went wrong); see also Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Constitutional Courts in the 
Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 117, 136-37 (2001) (explaining how the Russian constitutional court was 
nullified as part of the Russian constitution-making process). The constitutional order 
Yeltsin constructed, which contained both a very strong president and weak checking 
institutions, has continued to leave its imprint on Russian politics, long after Yeltsin 
left the scene. Russia continues to be a competitive authoritarian regime under Putin. 
See Valerie J. Bunce & Sharon L. Wolchik, Defeating Dictators: Electoral Change and 
Stability in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes, 62 WORLD POL. 43, 44 (2010) (noting 
that Russia remains a competitive authoritarian regime).  
 97 See Miklós Bánkuti et al., supra note 69, at 138-39. 
 98 See Hungary Government Party Support Lowest in Over a Decade — Poll, REUTERS 
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the kind of change that the Fidesz was subsequently able to carry out. 
Similarly, in Venezuela, Chavez won an election with only fifty-six 
percent of the national vote. His candidates then won sixty percent of 
votes in an election for a Constituent Assembly that was largely 
boycotted by the opposition, but this translated into over ninety 
percent of seats due to electoral rules handcrafted by Chavez himself.99 
The Constituent Assembly process, in which a single electoral group 
steamrolled the insignificant opposition, was not representative of any 
strong social consensus in favor of Chavez’s formula. Like the Fidesz, 
he effectively capitalized on a momentary surge in popularity to alter 
the shape of the democracy over the long haul. 
The argument against abusive constitutionalism does not depend on 
the particular policies pursued by these actors, but merely on the fact 
that they are making their regimes significantly less democratic. 
Chavez and Correa are leftist populists, Uribe is a right-leaning 
neoliberal, and the Fidesz party is a right-wing nationalist movement. 
There may be merit in some of the policies followed by these actors, 
and not in others.100 Regardless of policy orientation, the deterioration 
of both the public’s ability to vote these incumbents out and the 
weakening of horizontal checks that are supposed to hold them 
accountable is a substantial cause for concern. The absence of both 
vertical and horizontal checks appears to be related to a long list of 
negative outcomes: deterioration in the quality of policy, less 
responsiveness of politicians to the will of the public, and a higher 
incidence of human rights abuses.101 
If I am correct both that the creation of hybrid forms of 
authoritarianism through mechanisms of constitutional change is 
increasingly common and that these kinds of authoritarian regimes 
represent a threat about which we ought to be concerned, then the 
remaining key question is how to stop it. This is, of course, the million 
dollar question, and I spend the rest of this article tackling it. Parts II 
and III survey mechanisms of democratic defense in both comparative 
constitutional law and international law. My core conclusion is 
 
(June 7, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/07/oukwd-uk-hungary-parties-
idAFBRE8560F420120607. 
 99 See Segura & Bejarano, supra note 55, at 225 (describing how Chavez managed 
to manipulate the constitution-making process in Venezuela). 
 100 See, e.g., GREGORY WILPERT, CHANGING VENEZUELA BY TAKING POWER: THE 
HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE CHÁVEZ GOVERNMENT (2007) (defending the thrust of 
Chavez’s political policies). 
 101 See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 25, at 25-26 (observing the relationship between 
regimes that are not particularly competitive electorally and illiberalism, where 
regimes do not observe basic human rights). 
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unsettling — the existing tools at both levels are not very effective at 
controlling this threat. Moreover, the flexible nature of abusive 
constitutionalism (for example, the fact that there are often multiple 
ways for would-be authoritarians to achieve the same goal) makes it a 
difficult threat to combat. 
II. A CRITICAL REVIEW OF RESPONSES IN COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
In this Part, I survey key aspects of comparative constitutional 
design and scholarship that are supposed to make democratic 
constitutionalism resistant to erosion from within.102 My main 
conclusion is that these tools are largely ineffective against the threat 
posed by abusive constitutionalism. The next Part conducts a similar 
analysis of solutions and potential solutions at the international level. 
The post–World War II generation of constitutional scholarship 
developed the German conception of militant democracy, which holds 
that states may actively root out threats posed by illiberal or 
undemocratic groups attempting to use the forms of democracy to 
achieve their goals. The paradigm case, of course, was the Nazi’s 
overthrow of the democratic Weimar Republic from within. The most 
important manifestation of militant democracy is in modern party-
banning clauses, which generally allow constitutional courts to 
prohibit political parties with aims that run counter to the 
fundamental values of the democratic state. As I show below in section 
II(A), this kind of clause is of very limited value against the threat of 
abusive constitutionalism. The movements and parties that bear the 
fruit of abusive constitutionalism are generally too big, and their 
platforms too ambiguous, to be reasonably banned from the political 
sphere. Militant democracy is more effectively deployed against 
ideologically-charged threats to democracy, which are not as common 
today as they were during the beginning and middle of the twentieth 
century. 
More recent work has focused on controlling the mechanisms of 
constitutional amendment and change in order to fortify them against 
abusive constitutional maneuvering. The state-of-the-art here is a 
conception of constitutional change that one might call “selective 
 
 102 I bracket here the rich literature on how different forms of government 
structure might affect a polity’s likelihood of downfall. See, e.g., Juan L. Linz, 
Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?, in THE FAILURE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 3 (Juan L. Linz & Arturo Valenzuela eds., 1994) 
(concluding that presidential systems are more likely to be overthrown than 
parliamentary systems, and theorizing reasons for this difference). 
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rigidity.” In a selectively rigid order, the basic amendment threshold is 
set fairly low, allowing updating of constitutional texts. But core parts 
of the democratic order can be protected by two different methods: 
tiered amendment thresholds and the doctrine of unconstitutional-
constitutional amendments. The first method uses textual provisions 
to especially entrench certain vulnerable provisions by requiring 
higher supermajorities or other mechanisms. The second allows courts 
to strike down certain constitutional amendments that threaten the 
democratic order as substantively unconstitutional. Both mechanisms 
have become well-known within comparative constitutional law as 
ways to defend the democratic order against threats from within. 
In sections II(B) through II(D), I show that these tools, as well, are 
only of limited use in protecting against abusive constitutionalism. At 
least as currently practiced, both have significant weaknesses, which 
can be exploited by would-be authoritarian actors. Tiered 
constitutional amendment thresholds are often used to protect 
expressive values like the right to human dignity, rather than the 
kinds of provisions — like tenure protections for constitutional courts 
— that abusive constitutional practices tend to target. And given the 
fungibility of abusive constitutional practices — there are often many 
ways to achieve the same goals — it would be difficult to design an 
effective textual regime. 
The unconstitutional-constitutional amendments doctrine is 
intended to fill these gaps by giving courts a more flexible tool to 
respond to abusive constitutional practices. But both theory and 
experience suggests a real risk that courts cannot be depended upon to 
apply the doctrine in warranted cases, but rather will be both over- 
and under-inclusive. Moreover, the theoretical justification for tight 
control over constitutional amendments suggests a distinction 
between constitutional amendment and constitutional replacement 
that does not hold up in practice. Both are susceptible to abusive 
constitutional practice, as the Hungarian and Venezuelan cases show 
in Part I. Thus, the unconstitutional-constitutional amendments 
doctrine is likely to prove effective only if paired with restrictions on 
constitutional replacement. Such restrictions rarely exist. In short, we 
are a long way from developing a coherent system to control 
constitutional change, and it may not be feasible to construct such a 
system. 
A. Militant Democracy and Party Banning 
In comparative constitutional law, the German concept of militant 
democracy has been the major defense mechanism for democratic 
  
218 University of California, Davis [Vol. 47:189 
orders. It was invented in Germany following the end of World War II, 
and the obvious impetus was the way that the inter-war Weimar 
Republic was undermined and then overthrown by the anti-
democratic Nazi party during the 1920s and 1930s.103 Militant 
democracy is a rich concept with many elements, centered on a refusal 
to allow anti-democratic elements to use the freedoms and tools of 
democracy in order to destroy the democratic order.104 
However, most recent scholarship has focused on party-banning, or 
the ability of a constitutional court to dissolve parties that are 
considered essentially anti-democratic. The German Basic Law, for 
example, gives its Constitutional Court the power to ban parties that 
“by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to 
undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger 
the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany.”105 This provision 
was used to ban Neo-Nazi and Communist parties in the 1950s,106 and 
 
 103 The Nazi experience also impelled structural innovations in the design of 
parliamentary politics, such as the constructive vote of no confidence, which requires 
that actors seeking to bring down a democratic regime must first suggest an 
alternative government. See Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional 
Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1860 (2010) 
(discussing the possibilities for adopting the constructive vote of no confidence in the 
United States as a way to allow Congress to limit presidential power). 
 104 The party-banning clause emphasized here does not exhaust the reach of the 
model, but it is its most canonical element. The model, for example, also allows for 
restrictions on fundamental rights and the freedom of association for individuals and 
groups that take action against the democratic order. See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. 
I (Ger.) arts. 9, 11, 18. The German Constitutional Court has referred to the concept 
in contexts that are very far afield from party-banning, for example in the data mining 
context. Thus, the term has been given recent relevance as part of a package of anti-
terrorism measures. See, e.g., Russell A. Miller, Balancing Security and Liberty in 
Germany, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 369, 371-75 (2010) (looking at constitutional 
provisions allowing limitations on association and freedom of movement in light of 
post-9/11 security concerns); András Sajó, From Militant Democracy to the Preventive 
State?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2255, 2255-56 (2006) (theorizing a broad set of responses 
of a militant democracy to terrorist threats); Paul M. Schwartz, Regulating Govermental 
Data Mining in the United States and Germany: Constitutional Courts, the State, and New 
Technology, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 351, 380-81 (2011) (considering German 
jurisprudence on data screening practices in light of militant democracy principles). 
 105 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] 
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I (Ger.) art. 21. 
 106 See Communist Party Case, 5 BVerfGE 85 (1956); Socialist Reich Party Case, 2 
BVerfGE 1 (1952), in THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY 286, 286-89 (Donald P. Kommers & Russell A. Miller eds., 3d ed. 2012). See 
generally Judith Wise, Dissent and the Militant Democracy: The German Constitution and 
the Banning of the Free German Workers Party, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 301, 302-
03 (1998) (discussing the latter decision).  
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these provisions have been utilized in either the same or modified 
form in a number of countries like India, Israel, and Turkey.107 Samuel 
Issacharoff has recently put these provisions at the center of his 
scheme for the defense of “fragile democracies,” arguing that they may 
be abused in some cases, but if used properly, can prevent regimes 
from being taken over by anti-democratic forces.108 Similarly, Gregory 
Fox and Georg Nolte argue that party-banning of anti-democratic 
movements was clearly allowed by international law under certain 
circumstances, and likewise argued for its practical importance in 
preventing anti-democratic forces from taking over the state.109 
The argument of this section is that these provisions may be useful 
against traditional authoritarian or totalitarian threats carried by 
ideologically anti-democratic parties such as the Nazis, but are much 
less useful against the modern threats posed by abusive 
constitutionalism. The reasons are two-fold: First, unlike movements 
such as the Nazis, parties and actors that lead abusive constitutional 
movements have ambiguous platforms that are not clearly anti-
democratic in nature. In other words, the party-banning concept 
assumes that one can determine which parties are essentially anti-
democratic. This worked reasonably well with movements that 
espoused fundamental alternatives to democracy, such as Communism 
or National Socialism. But these sorts of movements are now rare; 
virtually all parties and movements now espouse at least a rhetorical 
commitment to democracy in some form. None of the movements 
examined in Part I were led by actors who rejected democracy.110 
Similarly, large Islamic movements such as the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood are mainly a threat to democracy not because of their 
ideology, but because they possess disproportionate power in a weak 
political environment.111 Like the abusive constitutionalist projects 
studied in Part I, the threat is not that they will overthrow democracy, 
but rather that they will bend it to their own concerns. The abusive 
constitutionalism project is not fueled by an alternative ideology, but 
instead by situational factors — the ability to dominate the political 
 
 107 See, e.g., Patrick Macklem, Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism, and the Paradox 
of Self-Determination, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 488, 493-94 (2006) (surveying constitutional 
provisions allowing for party banning). 
 108 See Issacharoff, Democracies, supra note 6, at 1466-67.  
 109 See Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
1, 2 (1995).  
 110 See supra Part I.B–D. 
 111 Cf. Jamie O’Connell, Common Interests, Closer Allies: How Democracy in Arab 
States Can Benefit the West, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 341, 389 (2012) (stating that the 
Muslim Brotherhood has adopted “notably democratic internal procedures”). 
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space in a country, and to use that space to entrench themselves in 
power for long periods of time. But this poses a serious problem for 
any efforts to ban such parties, because it means that they are difficult 
to identify by standard tools, such as party platforms, and that any 
effort to ban them is likely to prove grossly over-inclusive. 
Second, unlike most anti-democratic parties, which are fringe 
movements that are initially quite small, abusive constitutional 
movements tend to be carried by large majoritarian movements with 
substantial popular support.112 This means that attempts to ban such 
parties may themselves be destabilizing to the democratic order. 
Banning fringe parties may not matter much, since the small number 
of adherents may simply shift to more mainstream options. But a court 
that bans majoritarian and centrist movements is likely to be playing 
some variant of what has been called the “impossible game” — the 
large number of supporters will not accept an electoral regime without 
their player in it, and their protests will eventually force the regime to 
either become more repressive or to let the banned party back in.113 
Either way, the effort will fail in its core purpose. 
The Turkish experience with party-banning, which is the richest 
and most interesting among modern countries, offers instructive 
examples of both problems: the problem of identifying a competitive 
authoritarian movement as anti-democratic, and the problem of trying 
to ban majoritarian movements.114 In a series of important cases 
beginning in 1998, the Turkish Supreme Court banned significant 
political movements with widespread support. The rationale for these 
cases was that the movements at issue were Islamic in orientation, and 
thus contrary to the secular substantive values of the Turkish state. Yet 
unlike the Neo-Nazi and Socialist Party cases in Germany, the parties 
at issue in the Turkish cases were not fringe or extreme movements. 
They received substantial numbers of votes. The Welfare Party, for 
 
 112 Consider the movements led by Chavez in Part I.C or the Fidesz in Part I.D — 
neither was ideologically extreme and both received substantial popular support. 
 113 See RUTH BERINS COLLIER & DAVID COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA: 
CRITICAL JUNCTURES, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND REGIME DYNAMICS IN LATIN AMERICA 
487-88 (1991) (referring to the “impossible game” as the problem of the Argentine 
Peronist Party being unable to win elections because of its repugnance to elites despite 
previously being the majority party).  
 114 The discussion here does not exhaust the Turkish experience with party-
banning. In another series of decisions, for example, the country banned separatist 
parties associated with the Kurds. See Ödül Celep, The Political Causes of Party 
Closures in Turkey, PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 1, 13-16 (2012) (collecting and discussing 
decisions). These decisions raise questions of constitutional theory that are important 
but distinct — many of those who would defend bans on anti-democratic parties see 
bans of minority separatist parties as inherently more problematic. 
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example, won twenty-one percent of the vote and about one-third of 
the seats in 1995, and joined a majority coalition with a center-right 
secularist party, the True Path Party.115 The Welfare Party’s then-
leader, Necmettin Erbakan, became prime minister.116 After the 
military, trade unions, and business associations formed a common 
front against the Islamist party, the military declared Islamic parties to 
be anathema to core state values in 1997, and forced the party to 
resign from the ruling coalition.117 It was banned by the Constitutional 
Court in 1998, and this decision was upheld by the European Court of 
Human Rights.118 
The European Court’s decision upholding the ban is a troubling use 
of the militant democracy conception. It began by offering a ringing 
endorsement of militant democracy in the German mold: “[T]he 
Court considers that it is not at all improbable that totalitarian 
movements, organized in the form of political parties, might do away 
with democracy, after prospering under the democratic regime, there 
being examples of this in modern European history.”119 Further, the 
Court held that “a State cannot be required to wait, before intervening, 
until a political party has seized power and begun to take concrete 
steps to implement a policy incompatible with the standards of the 
Convention and democracy, even though the danger of that policy for 
democracy is sufficiently established and imminent.”120 
The decision becomes problematic in actually applying the militant 
democracy principles to the Welfare Party.121 The Court emphasized 
 
 115 See Saban Taniyici, Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: Islamist Welfare 
Party’s Pro-EU Turn, 9 PARTY POL. 463, 471-72 (2003). 
 116 See id. at 466, 472. 
 117 See Mehran Kamrava, Pseudo-Democratic Politics and Populist Possibilities: The 
Rise and Demise of Turkey’s Refah Party, 25 BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 275, 275 (1998) 
(referring to this incident as a “soft coup”). 
 118 See Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey [GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 
41343/98, 41344/98, § 133-36, ECHR 2003. This was in fact a grand chamber decision 
upholding an earlier decision made by a panel. See generally Refah Partisi (The 
Welfare Party) v. Turkey, nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98, ECHR 2001 
(laying out the prior panel decision). 
 119 Refah Partisi, ECHR 2003, § 99. 
 120 Id. § 102. 
 121 A substantial literature examines the decision from a religious perspective, 
debating whether the Court overreacted to the threat of Islamic parties in Europe and 
thus allowed undue infringement on religious liberty. See, e.g., Peter G. Danchin, 
Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
663, 699 (2011) (arguing that “[t]he Court’s analysis misconstrues the true nature of 
the conflict in Turkey, which, quite apart from questions of liberal rights and 
freedoms, centers on the locus of Islam as a source of political legitimacy among 
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that the party already had substantial support and had joined a 
majority coalition, and was likely poised to win large majorities in the 
near future. To the Court, this strengthened the case for a ban because 
it showed that the party might be able to actually implement its 
program; the Court did not, however, discuss the difficulties involved 
in banning an already very popular party.122 The Court then discussed 
in detail the party’s program, finding that its religious orientation and 
especially its adherence to variants of sharia law rendered it anti-
democratic. The Court noted that members of the party had made 
statements suggesting alteration of the legal system to recognize 
religious-based law to govern status and certain other private law 
questions and had praised sharia law.123 At root, the Court thought 
that the platform was religious in a way that was incompatible with 
democracy: “The Court concurs in the . . . view that sharia is 
incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy.”124 
The decision thus lays bare both the line-drawing and size 
problems. First, it is unclear whether the Welfare Party’s platform 
really was anti-democratic. The allowance of separate religious status 
courts in certain areas is used in many democracies, including 
Israel,125 and the modern Middle East is working towards finding a 
role for sharia law within democratic orders.126 While the Court did 
find that some members of the party had suggested, in ambiguous 
 
different elite groups in the historical context of Kemalism as a state-building 
project”); Claudia E. Haupt, Transnational Nonestablishment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
991, 1009-10 (2012) (arguing that the decision heralded a nonestablishment model in 
the Court’s jurisprudence). 
 122 See Refah Partisi, ECHR 2003, § 107-10. 
 123 See id. § 120-25. For example, the party’s leader, Necmettin Erbakan, had made 
statements to the following effect: “We shall guarantee to everyone the right to live as 
he sees fit and to choose the legal system he prefers . . . . When we are in power a 
Muslim will be able to get married before the mufti, if he wishes, and a Christian will 
be able to marry in church, if he prefers.” Id. § 28. 
 124 Id. § 123. 
 125 See, e.g., GARY J. JACOBSOHN, THE WHEEL OF LAW: INDIA’S SECULARISM IN 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 72-88 (2003) (explaining the Israeli system of 
religious status courts); see also Daphne Barak-Erez, Law and Religion Under the Status 
Quo Model: Between Past Compromises and Constant Change, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2495, 
2497 (2009). This model of course creates tensions with democratic values, but that 
does not necessarily make it incompatible with democracy in all its incarnations. 
 126 See generally RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010) (explaining 
ways in which courts are used to channel and control religious law in the Middle 
East); Kristen Stilt, “Islam is the Solution”: Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 73 (2010) (noting considerable vagueness in the 
platform of the Muslim Brotherhood, and thus finding it difficult to figure out exactly 
how their platform meshes with democratic values).  
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terms, the use of force or other extra-legal measures to gain power, it 
put little weight on this conclusion and had little support for it.127 The 
party was identifiably religious; it was probably not identifiably anti-
democratic. Further, the Court does little to explain why the banning 
of such a significant party, representing a broad swath of Turkish 
society, is likely to be effective. 
Instead of disappearing, elements of the Welfare Party formed a 
successor party, called the Virtue Party. The Virtue Party continued to 
espouse an Islamist agenda and contained many of the same actors as 
had earlier held power in the Welfare Party. The party did well in the 
1999 elections, winning fifteen percent of the vote and 111 of the 450 
parliamentary seats.128 But it was again banned by the Constitutional 
Court, which held that, although it was identifiably different from the 
old Welfare Party, it too had a fundamentally Islamic platform.129 Even 
after being banned a second time, the party did not disappear, but 
instead elements of it reformed as the Justice and Development Party, 
which has controlled Turkish politics with an absolute majority of the 
Parliament since the 2002 general elections.130 The party controlled 
363 of 550 seats in 2002, 341 of 550 seats in 2007, and 327 of 550 
seats in 2011.131 
Defenders of the party-banning paradigm, most notably Samuel 
Issacharoff, have argued that the Turkish case shows that it does work 
under modern scenarios, because the successive emanations of the 
party moderated somewhat from their previous incarnations.132 This is 
true, but may miss the larger point: the core interests represented by 
the party survived and it took power within a fairly short period of 
time. Moreover, one of the biggest problems now faced in modern 
Turkish politics is the predominant role of the Justice and 
 
 127 See Refah Partisi, ECHR 2003, § 130-31 (concluding, after canvassing relevant 
speeches, that “there was ambiguity in the terminology used to refer to the method to 
be employed to gain political power”). 
 128 See Birol A. Ye ilada, The Virtue Party, 3 TURKISH STUD. 62, 75 tbl.1 (2002). 
 129 See Asli Ü. Bâli, The Perils of Judicial Independence: Constitutional Transition and 
the Turkish Example, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 235, 281 n.156 (2012). 
 130 See Ergun Özbudun, From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of 
the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, 11 S. EUR. SOC’Y & POL. 543, 545-46 
(2006). 
 131 See Meltem Müftüler-Baç & E. Fuat Keyman, Turkey Under the AKP: The Era of 
Dominant-Party Politics, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2012, at 87. 
 132 See, e.g., Issacharoff, Democracies, supra note 6, at 1446-47 (arguing that 
“[u]nder the circumstances, it is difficult to imagine a better outcome”); Özbudun, 
supra note 130, at 548 (finding that the movement moderated through its successive 
emanations and its platform is now “hardly distinguishable from a liberal or 
conservative democratic party”). 
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Development Party.133 This occurred not because of the ideology of the 
party as much as because of its size relative to its competitors. The 
party has at times resorted to questionable methods in order to achieve 
its goals, for example, using legal proceedings to harass the 
opposition.134 It has also utilized its largely-unilateral control over 
constitutional reforms in a way that may have weakened the 
democratic nature of the state; for example, by radically altering the 
composition and powers of the Constitutional Court.135 
The Turkish experience demonstrates the limits of party-banning in 
dealing with situations where the main threat is the construction of a 
competitive authoritarian regime via the means of abusive 
constitutionalism. The strategy is unlikely to work well when dealing 
with ideologically ambiguous political forces, rather than those that 
are clearly anti-democratic. It is also unlikely to work well when 
dealing with majoritarian rather than fringe political forces. These are 
precisely the characteristics under which abusive constitutionalism 
tends to occur, and under which competitive authoritarian regimes 
form. Thus, party-banning and militant democracy have probably been 
overstated as solutions to modern authoritarian threats. 
B. Tiered Constitutional Amendment Thresholds 
The remainder of this Part focuses on the design of the mechanisms 
of constitutional change. Most countries have migrated towards a 
baseline level of constitutional amendment that is relatively easy, 
certainly far easier than in the United States. Indeed, the United States 
amendment procedure under Article V is considered among the most 
difficult in the world, requiring a two-thirds vote in both houses of 
Congress as well as ratification by three-quarters of the state 
legislatures.136 A developing literature suggests that a relatively low 
 
 133 See Ali Çarko lu, A New Electoral Victory for the ‘Pro-Islamists’ or the ‘New 
Centre-Right’? The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the July 2007 
Parliamentary Elections in Turkey, 12 S. EUR. SOC’Y & POL. 501, 516-17 (2007) (raising 
the possibility that Turkey “is moving towards a dominant party system similar to 
India, Japan or Italy before the 1990s”). 
 134 See, e.g., Sebnem Arsu, Arrest of Prosecutor in Turkey Exposes Tensions Between 
Secular and Religious Turks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/ 02/21/world/europe/21turkey.html?_r=0 (detailing questionable arrests). 
 135 Turkish scholars debate whether the reforms to the Constitutional Court and 
other tribunals packed it or simply constituted a liberalization and democratization of 
the judiciary. See, e.g., Bâli, supra note 129, at 295-309 (summarizing the debate and 
arguing that the reforms liberalized the Court’s composition and took away 
authoritarian elements in its design). 
 136 See Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions and Institutional Design, 97 VA. L. REV. 
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(although not too low) amendment threshold has desirable effects.137 
Empirical evidence finds that constitutions with an intermediate 
difficulty of amendment tend to last longer than those with either very 
easy or very difficult amendment thresholds.138 The hypothesis is that 
extremely easy amendment mechanisms are associated with 
constitutions that are considered meaningless by their own 
populations, while very rigid constitutions are replaced because they 
fail to adapt to the times.139 Based on this evidence, the U.S. 
Constitution appears to have survived despite, rather than because of, 
its very rigid amendment mechanisms. The U.S. Constitution has been 
extensively amended through extra-constitutional means,140 but 
scholars have uncovered relatively little evidence that these practices 
translate into other contexts.141 It may be that the United States has 
 
1435, 1438 (2011) (noting how difficult and time-consuming the U.S. amendment 
process is); see also DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 170 tbl.5.7 
(2006) (constructing an index showing that the United States has the second most 
difficult amendment process out of a list of countries); Michael J. Klarman, What’s So 
Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 184 (1998) (arguing that the 
Article V process is so difficult to use as to make change practically impossible). 
 137 But see John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1954-56 (2003) (noting that Article V “has become the 
constitutional provision commentators love to hate” and defending the provision as 
helping to maintain the core substantive commitments of the constitutional order). 
 138 See LUTZ, supra note 136, at 162 tbl.5.2; see also TOM GINSBURG ET AL., THE 
ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 140 fig.6.4 (2009) (showing a U-shaped 
relationship, and arguing that the ideal level of difficulty from the standpoint of 
endurance is roughly the Indian amendment process, which requires a two-thirds 
majority of Congress for most topics and, in addition, the approval of one-half of the 
states for certain topics). 
 139 See LUTZ, supra note 136, at 156. 
 140 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-7 (1991) (arguing that 
major constitutional change in the United States has taken place in extra-
constitutional ways rather than through the amendment process, as the Constitution 
is remade in certain “constitutional moments” by combinations of the public, political 
actors, and the courts); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: 
Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 459 (1994) 
(arguing that Article V procedures were not intended to be the exclusive avenue of 
constitutional reform, and presuppose a “background legal right of the people” to 
“alter or abolish Government via the proper legal procedures”). But see Henry P. 
Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 121, 121-22 (1996) (rejecting Amar’s argument based on an analysis of 
the intent of the framers). 
 141 See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry, Ackerman’s Higher Lawmaking in Comparative 
Constitutional Perspective: Constitutional Moments as Constitutional Failures?, 6 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 193, 228-30 (2008) (arguing that the Quebec secession case represented a 
case of extra-constitutional amendment by the Canadian Supreme Court, and calling 
on scholars to identify other such cases). 
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found a relatively unusual way of updating its Constitution that 
cannot easily be replicated elsewhere. Most evidence, at any rate, 
points towards making overall constitutional amendment relatively 
easy compared to the United States. 
Yet this design faces an obvious problem in that it would allow a 
constitutional order to be distorted from within very easily — the 
lower the amendment threshold, the more vulnerable a system would 
be to abusive constitutional amendments. The stock solution in 
modern constitutional theory is to use tiered amendment thresholds. 
The concept is simply to protect some parts of the constitutional text 
with heightened amendment requirements, making them more 
difficult to alter.142 The most basic form of tiering uses heightened 
supermajority requirements. For example, most parts of the South 
African Constitution may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the 
Parliament, but a set of foundational principles found in section I (as 
well as the principles governing amendment itself) are more difficult 
to change, and require the assent of seventy-five percent of 
Parliament.143 In extreme cases, some provisions might be made 
completely unamendable, as the Honduran Constitution has done 
with respect to presidential re-election, and as the German 
Constitution does with respect to certain core principles.144 
Despite the growing importance of tiered constitutionalism, there is 
still little scholarly work on both how to carry it out and what sorts of 
provisions ought to be protected. Considering the practice through the 
lens of abusive constitutionalism has implications for both points. 
First, on the “how” question, some theorists suggest that including a 
popular component to constitutional change (for example, by 
requiring the public to ratify the results of whatever amendment has 
 
 142 See Richard Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 709-10 
(2010) [hereinafter Handcuffs] (advocating for such a system to protect certain 
important provisions). 
 143 See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 74. The regime is a bit more complex — Chapter 
2 of the Constitution requires approval of two-thirds of the Parliament plus the assent 
of the National Council of Provinces, with the agreement of at least six provinces. See 
id. Any other provision may be amended with the assent of two-thirds of Parliament, 
or a vote of the National Council of Provinces if the provision concerns their interests. 
See id. 
 144 See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] 
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I (Ger.) art. 79, § 3 (“Amendments to this Basic 
Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation on 
principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 
shall be inadmissible.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS [CH] art. 374 
(making certain constitutional provisions completely unamendable). 
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passed the legislature) may increase the difficulty of amendment.145 
Empirical studies offer mixed results on the question of whether or 
not such requirements actually reduce the frequency of constitutional 
amendment.146 But regardless of whether or not such requirements 
decrease the frequency of amendment in the abstract, they seem 
unlikely to do much to curb abusive constitutional practices. Powerful 
political actors who are able to push their reforms through legislatures 
seem likely to have the ability to gain the requisite degree of direct 
popular support in most cases. Indeed, as the Chavez and Correa 
examples show, powerful leaders often use the public as a way to 
make an end-run around institutions when they cannot get what they 
want out of these institutions.147 Adding tiers to the constitution by 
adding referenda requirements or other forms of popular participation 
seems unlikely to be productive. 
In practice, the more common approach of adding higher 
supermajority requirements for certain changes seems more likely to 
be effective. But even relatively high supermajority requirements may 
not adequately protect democracy against abusive constitutional 
practices. The Hungarian example, in particular, shows that it may not 
be that difficult for movements to temporarily receive very high 
percentages of the vote.148 
This suggests the utility of a third, still under-theorized and under-
utilized aspect to constructing constitutional tiers: a temporal 
dimension.149 Time appears to be a particularly relevant dimension to 
combating the problem of abusive constitutionalism, because it can 
combat the ability of temporarily powerful political forces to entrench 
themselves in power for the long haul. Yet few constitutional orders 
utilize time effectively as a break on constitutional change. Some 
systems do require multiple votes on a constitutional issue, but often 
 
 145 See, e.g., LUTZ, supra note 136, at 168 tbl.5.6 (constructing an index of difficulty 
that adds significant points for constitutional amendment processes requiring popular 
referenda). 
 146 See, e.g., John Ferejohn, The Politics of Imperfection: The Amendment of 
Constitutions, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 501, 523 (1997) (finding that popular 
involvement via ratification adds little difficulty to amendment processes).  
 147 See supra Part I.C.  
 148 See supra Part I.D.  
 149 See Albert, Handcuffs, supra note 142, at 711 (noting and recommending a 
regime of “sequential approval,” where citizens have to manifest their will to alter the 
constitution in more than one vote, and that vote is separated by an interval of time); 
Vermeule, supra note 136, at 1438 (noting one potential benefit of Article V 
amendment procedures, which is that their slowness may induce “sober second 
thoughts”). 
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with no restriction or only a minimal restriction on interval.150 A far 
better model, which is rarely found in practice, would require an 
intervening election between efforts at constitutional change, 
preferably of both the legislature and (in presidential systems) of the 
executive.151 The intervening election requirement is helpful because it 
reduces the possibility that incumbent politicians and parties can take 
advantage of temporary spikes in their popularity to push through 
amendments that are harmful to democracy. Thus, the ideal tiered 
regime would seem to include temporal restrictions that require 
multiple votes on amendments, with a long period of time (and ideally 
an intervening election) between the votes. These temporal limitations 
are probably the most important variable in terms of combatting 
abusive constitutional practices, although they might be used along 
with the far more common practice of increasing the voting 
threshold.152 
The more difficult problem is in determining which kinds of 
provisions deserve to be placed on the higher amendment tier or tiers. 
Here there has been virtually no theoretical work, and indeed scholars 
seem to assume that the answers are highly specific to the individual 
political culture at issue. We might call this an “expressivist” theory of 
constitutional tiering, in which a state protects its most fundamental 
values by giving them a special degree of entrenchment. A classic 
example is Germany, where the Basic Law makes its most basic 
 
 150 As an example, the Colombian Constitution requires two separate votes on a 
constitutional amendment, and requires that those votes be taken during separate 
legislative sessions. The first vote requires a simple majority of Congress, while the 
second requires an absolute majority. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] 
art. 375. Although this model technically requires two separate votes, these votes need 
be separated by very little time — Congress can, and often does, take the first vote 
towards the end of one legislative session, and take the other only a few days or weeks 
later at the beginning of the next. Moreover, since each legislative session is only one 
year, the requirement does not normally interpose a legislative or presidential election. 
See generally James Melton, Constitutional Amendment Procedures: A Summary and 
Critique of Existing Measures (June 18, 2012) (unpublished working paper) (on file 
with author), available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctqjm0/Files/melton_amendment.pdf 
(commenting on the problems with measuring temporal limitations in the literature). 
 151 This model is used, for example, in Greece, which requires that amendments be 
voted on by two different Parliaments via two different voting thresholds — fifty 
percent in one vote and sixty percent in the other. See 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] 
[CONSTITUTION] 110 (Greece). 
 152 Empirically, there is no research on this question. Researchers have extensively 
considered the relationship between different kinds of amendment regimes and the 
amendment rate, but have had trouble measuring temporal limitations. See Melton, 
supra note 150, at 28 (noting that temporal limitations are “trivialized by existing 
measures of amendment difficulty”). 
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principles, particularly “human dignity,” unamendable by any 
means.153 South Africa takes a very similar tactic: it places basic values 
such as “human dignity,” “non-racialism and non-sexism,” and 
“universal adult suffrage” on the highest tier, which requires a three-
quarters rather than two-thirds majority of Parliament for 
amendment.154 
This approach to allocating tiers may play some role in helping to 
define the basic values of the state by holding these values out for 
special protection. But it is badly antiquated as a strategy for defending 
democracy. It appears aimed at the same kind of totalitarian or 
fundamentally anti-democratic threat as the party-banning clauses and 
the militant democracy concept studied in section II(A).155 Modern 
“competitive authoritarian” movements do not generally seek to 
destroy the basic values of the constitutional order nor seek some 
radically different vision for the shape of the state.156 They would not 
be interested in altering fundamental constitutional principles such as 
“human dignity,” so long as they could carry out enough institutional 
alterations to perpetuate their own power. 
Thus, an analysis of abusive constitutional practices suggests that 
these are not the most important constitutional clauses to be 
entrenching on a higher tier. We need more empirical research on 
exactly how competitive authoritarian regimes work within 
constitutional orders in order to have a fuller response to the question. 
However, the expressivist approach to entrenchment seems aimed at 
precisely the wrong things: competitive authoritarian regimes take 
power by attacking the constitutional structure in subtle ways, rather 
than by taking aim at either basic constitutional principles or rights. 
Protecting the constitutional structure against abusive constitutional 
practices is quite difficult. The most obvious and common provisions 
are those entrenching term limits, which proved to be the flashpoint of 
contention in the Honduran case.157 As the Hungarian case in 
 
 153 See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] 
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I (Ger.) art. 79, § 3 (protecting the division of the 
state into Länder and certain basic principles such as human dignity from ever being 
amended).  
 154 See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 74. 
 155 See supra Part II.A (considering the post-war German model of militant 
democracy, which aims to eliminate anti-democratic threats from the democratic 
order). 
 156 See supra Part I.E (noting that competitive authoritarian regimes gain power not 
by proposing a radically different vision for the state, but by disabling opposition 
parties and packing or disabling checking institutions). 
 157 See supra Part III.A (noting the entrenchment of presidential term limits in 
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particular shows, abusive constitutional actors also may attack a range 
of other provisions that bear on the central structural characteristics of 
those checking institutions which are supposed to rein in the political 
branches. Provisions bearing on the size, composition, and tenure of 
high-ranking judges might be particularly valuable, and yet are 
generally unprotected in existing constitutions. Similarly, they might 
attack the tenure and selection mechanisms of other key mechanisms 
of horizontal accountability such as ombudsmen and attorneys 
general. 
Crafting a set of tiered constitutional protections that would fully 
protect the constitutional structure is likely to prove impossible. No 
single provision is likely to prove decisive, since abusive 
constitutionalists have many ways to achieve the same goal. For 
example, an actor stymied in altering a key structural provision might 
get a similar result by packing or undermining the court, a result that 
could be achieved by altering the selection mechanism, reducing 
jurisdiction, or in a host of other ways. In the absence of overarching 
protection, would-be autocrats may be able to find alternative 
provisions at both the constitutional and statutory level to achieve 
identical ends, thus effectively working around tiered provisions.158 
And, of course, the entire constitutional structure cannot be 
subjected to higher-tiered protection because such an approach would 
make the constitutional order entirely rigid, as opposed to just 
selectively rigid and aimed at abusive constitutional threats. It would 
block many innocuous changes as well as some dangerous ones. One 
of the problems with abusive constitutionalism is precisely that the 
same set of constitutional changes can be dangerous in one situation 
and innocuous or beneficial in others. The Hungarian constitutional 
changes, a kind of “Frankenstate” cobbled together from a set of 
common constitutional provisions and legal rules found in many well-
functioning constitutional orders, are a case in point. The tiering 
mechanism is not discriminating enough to separate out the 
dangerous constitutional changes from the innocuous ones. The stock 
answer to the deficiencies of constitutional tiering is the 
unconstitutional-constitutional amendments doctrine, which is the 
focus of the next section. 
 
Honduras). 
 158 As an example, consider the Hungarian case in Part I.D — the Fidesz party 
utilized a variety of alternative means to undermine the Constitutional Court and the 
judiciary, including packing the court, stripping part of its jurisdiction, and lowering 
the retirement age for judges. Some of these changes required constitutional alteration 
or replacement, but others required mere statutory changes. 
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C. The Unconstitutional-Constitutional Amendments Doctrine 
A series of countries have developed the so-called “unconstitutional-
constitutional amendment doctrine,” which holds that a constitutional 
amendment can itself be substantively unconstitutional under certain 
conditions. The doctrine has been espoused by courts such as the 
German, Indian, Turkish, and Colombian Constitutional Courts. In 
Colombia, as noted above, the Court recently used the doctrine to 
prevent President Alvaro Uribe Velez from amending the Constitution 
to run for a third consecutive term in office.159 The Court held that the 
proposed amendment would constitute a “substitution of the 
constitution,” rather than an amendment, because it fundamentally 
changed the separation of powers in the country.160 The Turkish 
Constitutional Court struck down an amendment allowing Islamic 
headscarves to be worn in universities; the Court held that this 
amendment was contrary to the secular constitutional order.161 Finally, 
in an example closer to home, the California Supreme Court discussed 
the doctrine in the context of Proposition 8, which banned gay 
marriage in the state.162 The proponents argued that the amendment 
 
 159 See supra Part I.B.  
 160 See supra text accompanying notes 35–43. 
 161 A woman denied the ability to wear a headscarf then took her case to the 
European Court of Human Rights, which ruled that her right to religious freedom had 
not been infringed. See Leyla  ahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, § 122-23, ECHR 
2005; see also Cindy Skach, International Decision, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 186, 195 (2006) 
(arguing that the case illustrates a complex interrelationship between domestic and 
international law on this issue). The case lies somewhere between the non-textual 
unconstitutional-constitutional amendments doctrine constructed by the Indian and 
Colombian Courts and the tiering practice noted above. The Turkish constitution 
does make some provisions unamendable, and this includes the provision prohibiting 
amendments to Article 2, which lays out the “basic characteristics” of the state and 
defines Turkey as being “a democratic, secular and social State.” See Yaniv Roznai & 
Serkan Yolcu, An Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment — The Turkish 
Perspective: A Comment on the Turkish Constitutional Court’s Headscarf Decision, 10 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 175, 194 (2012). But the court interpreted this doctrine to allow it to 
strike down constitutional amendments found elsewhere in the Constitution that 
infringe on the secular principle, which makes its usage very similar to the non-
textual, common-law like usage of the Indian and Colombian Courts.  
 162 See Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 444 (2009) (finding that the Proposition 
does not constitute a constitutional revision because it does not undertake “far 
reaching change in the fundamental governmental structure or the foundational 
power of its branches as set forth in the Constitution”). Strauss is in fact part of a long 
line of California cases interpreting the amendment/revision distinction. See, e.g., 
Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Kempton, 40 Cal. 4th 1016, 1046-47 (2007) (concluding 
that a constitutional change dealing with the contracting of architectural and 
engineering services is not a revision); Legislature v. EU, 54 Cal. 3d 492 (1991) 
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constituted not an amendment, but rather a revision, which required a 
more stringent process under the California Constitution than mere 
majority approval by referendum.163 The Court, after an extensive 
discussion of the history of the distinction and relevant doctrine, 
found that the change was an amendment and thus that the method 
used was proper.164 The doctrine of unconstitutional-constitutional 
amendments has thus passed from the fringe of constitutional theory 
towards its center. 
But the doctrine has also been subjected to an avalanche of scholarly 
criticism.165 The crux of the critique is easy to make out: the doctrine 
seems to be “the most extreme of counter-majoritarian acts.”166 In 
other words, while ordinary judicial review overrides political action, 
the judicial decision might in turn be overridden by constitutional 
amendment.167 In countries where constitutional amendment is 
 
(holding that a proposition which adopted legislative term limits, limited spending on 
legislative staff, and restricted state retirement benefits was not a revision); Raven v. 
Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 349-55 (1990) (finding that a sweeping set of reforms to 
criminal procedure rules under the state constitution, intended to overturn numerous 
pro-defendant rulings of the California State Supreme Court, did indeed constitute a 
revision and thus was invalidated).  
 163 An amendment may be proposed either by a two-thirds vote of the legislature, 
or by petition of eight percent of voters. In either case, the amendment is approved 
with the consent of a majority of voters. A revision is proposed by either a two-thirds 
vote of the legislature or a Constituent Assembly (which itself must be called by a 
two-thirds vote of the legislature followed by majority approval of the electorate). See 
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8; id. art. XVIII, §§ 1–4.  
 164 See Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 444. 
 165 See, e.g., Richard Albert, Nonconstitutional Amendments, 22 CAN. J.L. & JUR. 5, 
22-23 (2009) [hereinafter Amendments] (calling the basic structure doctrine “curious,” 
although suggesting some possible lines of defense); Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism 
and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 
495, 501 n.34 (1989) (stating that basic structure doctrine “remains a highly 
problematic and controversial element of Indian constitutional law”); Andrew B. 
Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
1025, 1069-70 (2010) (declaring that Indian basic structure doctrine “lack[s] any 
basis in original understanding”); Gary J. Jacobsohn, An Unconstitutional Constitution? 
A Comparative Perspective, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 460, 487 (2006) (commenting that “if 
ever confronted with the felt need to exercise this option, sober heads might well 
wonder whether it was any longer worth doing”); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Envisioning A 
Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 58 n.268 (2003) (referring to the basic 
structure doctrine as an “extreme example of judicial activism”). 
 166 Gary J. Jacobsohn, The Permeability of Constitutional Borders, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1763, 1799 (2004) (nonetheless suggesting possible justifications for the doctrine). 
 167 See Miguel Schor, The Strange Cases of Marbury and Lochner in the 
Constitutional Imagination, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1463, 1477-80 (2009) (arguing that foreign 
countries adopted easier amendment thresholds and other mechanisms partly because 
of unrestrained fear of judicial power as expressed through Lochner). 
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relatively easy (unlike in the United States), this is a real check on the 
power of judicial review. But the unconstitutional-constitutional 
amendments doctrine takes away this safety valve by allowing courts 
to strike down even constitutional amendments. Such an approach 
faces “obvious” problems from the standpoint of democratic theory.168 
A focus on the practice of abusive constitutionalism suggests a 
justification for the doctrine, and an advantage over the use of 
constitutional tiers in the text. First, most constitutional orders are not 
well-crafted to deal with the modern dangers to democracy — they 
either fail to include tiered provisions at all or they tier the wrong 
kinds of things such as expressivist provisions, as the South African 
example shows.169 Second, even an ideally-crafted constitution, with 
appropriate tiered provisions protecting key structural provisions, 
would not fully prevent the problem of abusive constitutionalism. 
Only certain limited parts of the constitution can be tiered; any 
alternative design would lose many of the benefits of constitutional 
flexibility. And would-be autocrats are experts in figuring out 
alternative ways to achieve the same ends. The Hungarian example 
illustrates the point with respect to the constitutional judiciary: rather 
than replacing the Constitutional Court or changing its tenure rules, 
the Fidesz simply added more positions to the Court, and therefore is 
moving towards “packing” it.170 
As Issacharoff has pointed out, the doctrine of unconstitutional-
constitutional amendments makes sense in such a world precisely 
because of its flexibility — it allows judges to defend the 
constitutional order without being constrained by the limits of 
constitutional text.171 The core concerns of abusive constitutionalism 
are useful as a potential anchor, helping to make its usage more 
precise and justifiable. The claim is not that abusive constitutionalism 
necessarily offers the sole justification for the doctrine’s use.172 My 
 
 168 Rosalind Dixon, Transnational Constitutionalism and Unconstitutional 
Constitutional Amendments (May 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1840963. 
 169 See supra text accompanying notes 153–154. 
 170 See supra Part I.D.  
 171 See Samuel Issacharoff, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Hedging, 99 GEO. 
L.J. 961, 1002 (2011) [hereinafter Courts] (noting that the basic structure approach 
may be valuable because it may not be “apparent from the outset of a democracy 
which provisions may prove to be central,” and that ex ante exposition of the 
provisions may be impossible). 
 172 In contrast, uses in other areas often seem more problematic. For example, both 
the Turkish and Indian Courts have suggested that “secularism” may be a basic part of 
their respective constitutional orders. In Turkey, the Constitutional Court in 2005 
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claim instead is more modest — it is particularly well-suited and well-
justified by these practices. Thus, focusing on these practices helps to 
resolve an important conceptual problem: it clarifies the kinds of 
situations where the notoriously vague doctrine ought to be 
invoked.173 
This perspective comports with that of other scholars who have 
suggested a “pragmatic” defense of the doctrine. Thus Issacharoff 
argues that the judicial construction of immutable principles in new 
democracies may help to prevent them from eroding from within by 
“protect[ing] the core features of contested democratic governance.”174 
Similarly, Bernal tracks the use of the doctrine in the Colombian 
experience, and argues that it plays a valuable function in hyper-
presidentalist regimes.175 Using the Uribe case as an example, he notes 
that strong presidents can exercise disproportionate influence over 
these systems, co-opting amendment processes to serve their own 
 
struck down a constitutional amendment allowing headscarves to be worn in 
universities because it struck down basic principles of secularism found in the 
constitutional order. This decision was upheld by the European Court of Human 
Rights. See Leyla  ahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, § 114-115, ECHR 2005. The 
main question here, as recognized by the European Court, is whether secularism is 
necessary for maintaining a democratic order in Turkey. See id. This conclusion seems 
problematic in light of both a broader literature on constitutionalism and in light of 
subsequent experience in Turkey itself — both suggest that democratic 
constitutionalism is robust to some religious involvement. See, e.g., Roznai & Yolcu, 
supra note 161, at 204 (arguing, inter alia, that allowing students to wear headscarves 
would not contravene the constitutional secularism principle). In India, secularism 
crops up in a different context, as a way to tamp down on religious tensions that 
might unravel the multi-ethnic state and allow majoritarian religious groups to attack 
minority religions groups. The use might seem more justifiable in this kind of context, 
but it might also be redundant. Given the thickness of work on constitutional design 
in multiethnic democracies, designers now have a range of tools in representative 
bodies and elsewhere for dealing with these kinds of threats. See generally DONALD L. 
HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (2d ed. 2000) (considering the problem); 
AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977) 
(same). It is perhaps telling that the Indian Supreme Court has used the secularist 
“basic structure” principle not as a way to strike down constitutional amendments, 
but rather as a way to justify declarations of emergency by the central government 
against ultra-religious groups. See S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 2 S.C.R. 644 
(upholding emergency measures replacing ultra-Hindu governors who encouraged 
religiously-based measures against Islamic sites, on the grounds that the actions were 
necessary to preserve secularism). 
 173 Of course, this does not eliminate the need for difficult judicial judgments on 
when a given constitutional change truly threatens the democratic order, which is a 
topic for future work. 
 174 Issacharoff, Courts, supra note 171, at 1002. 
 175 See, e.g., Bernal-Pulido, supra note 36 (justifying the constitutional replacement 
doctrine in hyper-presidential regimes on conceptual and normative arguments). 
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interests and thus permanently reducing the quality of the democracy. 
This is particularly true in systems, like the Colombian, where 
constitutional amendment is relatively easy.176 
This justification also helps explain the doctrine’s notorious 
vagueness; judges and commentators often have difficulty in linking 
successful use of the doctrine either to individual textual provisions or 
to clear structural principles.177 The reason is because the doctrine is 
being aimed at a moving target — it is protecting democracy from 
substantial movement along the spectrum towards authoritarianism, 
rather than at protecting any single constitutional principle in 
isolation. 
For example, the Indian Supreme Court’s most aggressive uses of 
the doctrine came in three key decisions that all dealt with the same 
underlying event — the events surrounding the “emergency” declared 
by Indira Gandhi, where she effectively suspended both elections and 
many civil liberties for two years.178 The measures enacted by Gandhi 
that were struck down under the doctrine primarily comprised 
attempts to insulate certain core matters such as expropriation claims, 
nationalizations, electoral disputes, and the constitutional amendment 
power itself from judicial control.179 The resonance between the kinds 
of measures enacted by Gandhi and modern competitive authoritarian 
projects is striking: she took measures both to disable electoral 
opposition (fraud, harassment, etc.) and to weaken key checking 
institutions, including the Supreme Court. The decisions taken by the 
Court in those years were justified less by a search for basic structural 
 
 176 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] arts. 374-78 (explaining the 
different processes for constitutional amendment, which require only a simple 
majority legislative approval in the first round and an absolute majority in the 
second). 
 177 See Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299 (India) (expressing 
broad disagreement within the judicial opinions about exactly what principles of the 
basic structure a particular constitutional amendment violated); see also Albert, 
Amendments, supra note 165, at 23 (noting that “the contours of the basic structure 
doctrine remain unsettled”). 
 178 See generally Manoj Mate, Two Paths to Judicial Power: The Basic Structure 
Doctrine and Public Interest Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L 
L.J. 175, 183-88 (2010) (detailing the emergency in the context of the relevant 
caselaw).  
 179 See Minerva Mills v. Union of India, (1980) 4 S.C.C. 222 (amendments 
insulating nationalization and constitutional amendments from judicial review); 
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain, (1975) 2 S.C.C. 159 (amendments insulating 
elections from judicial review); Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 
S.C. 1461 (amendments insulating expropriation from judicial review); see also SUDHIR 
KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: A STUDY OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE 
DOCTRINE 43-69 (2009).  
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principles, on which the Court consistently fragmented, than by a 
consensus that Gandhi’s actions, taken as a whole, were a substantial 
threat to the democratic order.180 These decisions only chipped away 
at Gandhi’s program, but they may have called public attention to her 
undermining of the democratic order.181 
Similarly, the Colombian Constitutional Court struggled to 
articulate a criteria in order to distinguish a constitutional amendment 
allowing two consecutive presidential terms (which was upheld) and 
amending it to allow three consecutive terms (which was struck 
down). Again, however, the persuasiveness of the Court’s inquiry 
depended on its concrete assessment of the impact on the Colombian 
political system. A third term would have given Uribe the power to 
appoint nearly all of the officials who were supposed to be checking 
him. Perhaps more importantly, it would have given him informal 
control, through patronage and other means, over nearly every aspect 
of the state, and would have made him nearly impossible to 
dislodge.182 The Court’s decision aimed at identifying a constitutional 
change that would have implied a substantial movement along the 
spectrum towards authoritarianism. 
Finally, the fact that the doctrine may be used to protect basic 
principles of the democratic order may help to alleviate or at least 
problematize concerns about it being the ultimate undemocratic or 
counter-majoritarian act that a court can carry out. First, as noted in 
detail in Part I, constitutional amendment processes can easily be used 
to carry out the agendas of particular actors or political groups; they 
do not necessarily represent the will of the “people” in an 
uncontestable sense.183 Second, the examples of Hungary, Venezuela, 
 
 180 For an example, see Shri Raj Narain, 2 S.C.C. at 412 where the four justices 
voting that the electoral amendment at issue violated the basic structure doctrine did 
so using three different theories: democracy, equality, and structural encroachment on 
judicial power. 
 181 See Raju Ramachandran, The Supreme Court and the Basic Structure Doctrine, in 
SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 107, 
120 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000). 
 182 See supra text accompanying notes 36–43. 
 183 See supra Part I. I do not of course seek to adopt any single definition of the 
“people” for this purpose, nor do I take a position on whether such a definition is 
possible. As others have noted, this is an extraordinarily difficult practical 
undertaking, especially but not exclusively in multi-ethnic polities. See, e.g., Richard 
S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 738-43 (2011) (noting problems 
that arise in determining whether a population is sufficiently coherent to be 
considered one people). I merely argue that the use of the popular will by leaders such 
as Chavez, Correa, and the Fidesz was problematic, and that they effectively wielded a 
contestable claim into sweeping constitutional transformation. 
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Colombia, and Ecuador all show that mechanisms of constitutional 
change may often be used to damage the democratic order over the 
long term, making it more difficult to dislodge incumbents or to hold 
them accountable.184 The use of the doctrine of unconstitutional-
constitutional amendments may merely be a way to protect democracy 
over the longer term from certain extreme exercises of political power 
that threaten the institutional order itself. This suggests a type of 
process-based defense: One common justification for judicial review is 
that courts have the power to take counter-majoritarian actions to 
protect democratic channels themselves, and in an extreme form this 
may describe the proper use of the doctrine of unconstitutional-
constitutional amendments.185 
Still, this justification for the doctrine raises important problems, 
which tend to undermine its effectiveness in practice. First, there is 
some evidence that the doctrine has tended to expand through time, as 
courts find more and more parts of the constitution to be “basic.” In 
other words, there may be substantial risks that the doctrine tends to 
be over-inclusive. In some contexts, the identification of the parts of 
the constitutional order that are basic seems to jive surprisingly well 
with the constitutional court’s own jurisprudence, suggesting that the 
doctrine is sometimes used for turf-protection.186 For example, the 
Colombian Court recently suggested that a legislative attempt to 
recriminalize drug possession following a judicial decision 
decriminalizing it would likely constitute a substitution of the 
constitution because it would partially replace core values like human 
dignity and autonomy.187 In another recent decision, the Court struck 
down a constitutional amendment intended to evade its decisions 
requiring the civil service regime to be applied retroactively to 
incumbent office-holders.188 It held that the amendment infringed core 
 
 184 See supra Part I.  
 185 Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 181-82 (1980) (arguing for a 
process-based defense of United States constitutional law, called “representation 
reinforcement,” as a way to combat the counter-majoritarian difficulty).  
 186 Consider also the recent cases in India where the Court has used the basic 
structure doctrine to limit efforts to set up a parallel system of administrative courts 
separate from the ordinary judiciary and more dependent on the government. See 
Ramachandran, supra note 181, at 122-23 (listing cases). It is true that this sort of 
action could be used as part of a plan of abusive constitutionalism, but in the context 
where the relevant provisions were struck down, there was no such threat. 
 187 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Julio 22, 2011, 
Sentencia C-574/11, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.), available at 
http://corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2011/c-574-11.htm. 
 188 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Agosto 27, 2009, 
Sentencia C-588/09, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.), available at 
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constitutional principles protecting “meritocracy.” Even for defenders 
of the doctrine, this expansive dynamic is disturbing. It amplifies the 
democratic concerns associated with the doctrine, and by making the 
constitution unduly rigid it may push politicians towards more 
disruptive mechanisms of change, especially wholesale constitutional 
replacement. 
More importantly, there are reasons to think that the doctrine will 
prove to be fairly under-inclusive. It not only will tend to be used 
where it does not need to be used, but it will also fail where it most 
needs to be used. As the Colombian, Venezuelan, and Hungarian 
examples showed, these cases require courts to undertake decisions to 
stop highly popular and powerful actors in cases that touch their core 
interests and during periods of institutional and constitutional stress. 
The examples above show that courts were able to play a significant 
role in each case, but with varying results. Colombia remains the 
major positive example, where a court decision is credited with 
helping to save democracy in the country.189 In Hungary, in contrast, 
the Constitutional Court has played a much more ambiguous role, 
blocking some individual measures but declining to deploy the basic 
structure doctrine in the face of significant political pressure.190 
Moreover, as the Fidesz continues to control the political levers in the 
country, it has moved towards gaining effective control over the 
Court. In the long run, then, the Court is unlikely to prove an effective 
check on the Fidesz. 
There are reasons to think that the Colombian example is 
exceptional. As commentators have pointed out, political actors may 
pay a high price both internationally and domestically for flatly 
disobeying judicial decisions.191 Decisions can still be ignored, and 
hostile courts shut down, but it may be more difficult for politicians to 
take these steps than it once was.192 In that sense, courts are more 
 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2009/C-588-09.htm. 
 189 See supra Part I.B. 
 190 See supra text accompanying notes 72–73. 
 191 See, e.g., Issacharoff, Courts, supra note 171, at 1010-11 (arguing that court 
decisions do have bite in many difficult institutional contexts, although admitting that 
courts sometimes fail to carry out this role or are ignored by other institutions).  
 192 Still, there are several well-known examples of these practices. In Belarus, the 
competitive authoritarian President Alexander Lukashenko ignored constitutional 
court rulings holding that he had violated the Constitution sixteen times during his 
first two years in office. See LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 25, at 79. In Russia, in 
perhaps the best known example of judicial inefficacy, President Yeltsin closed down a 
recalcitrant Constitutional Court after it held unconstitutional several of his decrees 
relating to the constitutional process. See Epstein et al., supra note 96, at 136-37. 
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relevant during episodes of abusive constitutionalism than they were 
during classic military coups. The easier way for a hybrid or 
competitive authoritarian regime to control a court is to pack it — 
packing a court is relatively quiet, and a pocket court is highly 
unlikely to deploy tools like the basic structure doctrine against its 
own regime. Any competitive authoritarian regime that is linked to a 
durable political movement — as was the case in Venezuela, and is 
now the case in Hungary — is likely to succeed in packing its 
Constitutional Court once given enough time.193 
D. The Theoretical Gap of Constitutional Replacement 
A final problem with the unconstitutional-constitutional 
amendment doctrine is that it rests on problematic theoretical 
foundations that leave constitutional replacement (as opposed to 
constitutional amendment) unprotected against abusive constitutional 
practices. These foundations assume that only constitutional 
amendment — and not constitutional replacement — raise risks of 
abuse. Yet as shown in Part I, both constitutional amendment and 
constitutional replacement raise these risks. 
Faced with the anti-majoritarian critique of the unconstitutional-
constitutional amendments doctrine noted above, scholars have 
developed an essentially process-based defense of the doctrine. Vicki 
Jackson, for example, has recently argued that the doctrine might be 
strengthened if it is viewed not as cutting off all avenues for 
democratic override, but instead as simply asserting that one 
particular method of popular change — constitutional amendment — 
is unavailable, and that democratic figures must proceed by using 
some other, more demanding procedure.194 She calls this form of 
review “substantive procedural” review.195 In some cases, this defense 
of the doctrine is easy to spot, as in California. As many state 
constitutions did at one time, the California Constitution distinguishes 
 
 193 In Venezuela, for example, the judiciary played some role in checking Chavez 
early on in his presidency, but has lost its remaining independence through time. See 
Raul A. Sanchez Urribarri, Courts Between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarianism: 
Evidence from the Venezuelan Supreme Court, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 854, 854 (2011). 
 194 See Vicki Jackson, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: A Window into 
Constitutional Theory and Transnational Constitutionalism, in DEMOKRATIE-
PERSPEKTIVEN: FESTSCHRIFT FUR BRUN-OTTO BRYDE ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 47, 60-62 
(Michael Bauerle et al. eds., 2013) (“Tiered amendment procedures enforced through 
substantive procedural review has the effect of making some provisions harder, but 
not impossible, to amend, thereby ensuring constitutional justice commitments to 
retain their democratic or consensual rooting.”). 
 195 See id. at 60.  
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between “amendment” and “revision,” and requires revisions to go 
through more demanding procedures.196 By telling the political 
branches that they cannot change the constitution via amendment, the 
California Supreme Court is in essence requiring constitutional 
change via the more exacting method of revision. 
Most foreign constitutions do not have such an explicit two-tiered 
procedure for constitutional change, but it is possible to infer one if 
we assume that replacing the constitution is the alternative to 
amending it. In this way, the doctrine may again be understood as a 
safeguard of the constituent power of the people. The theory helps to 
bolster the democratic legitimacy of the doctrine by suggesting that 
courts applying it are merely acting as gatekeepers to shunt different 
kinds of change through the correct pathway, rather than altogether 
stopping democratic debate on a given issue. Certain changes require 
the higher-level deliberation implied by constitutional replacement, 
rather than ordinary constitutional amendment procedures. 
Such a position aligns with Bruce Ackerman’s two-track theory of 
constitutionalism in the United States. Ackerman argues that in most 
cases in American history, the constituted political branches acted 
under the rules of an existing political order, but in a few key 
instances (most notably after the Civil War and during the New Deal) 
political figures gained such enduring and deep support that they 
effectively acted in the name of the people to remake the 
Constitution.197 The process-based defenses of the unconstitutional-
constitutional amendment doctrine suggest a similar distinction 
between the ordinary constituted powers (which possess only a 
limited constitutional amendment power) and the “people” (who 
possess a plenary power to remake the constitutional order). 
This also appears to be how the doctrine is understood in many of 
the systems that regularly use it. For example, the Indian Supreme 
Court has held that the basic structure doctrine is a limitation on 
article 368 — which governs Parliament’s power to amend the 
Constitution — and so presumably not on the power of a Constituent 
Assembly or other entity to replace the Constitution.198 More 
explicitly, the Colombian Constitutional Court has held that the 
“substitution of the Constitution doctrine” limits constitutional 
 
 196 See supra text accompanying note 163.  
 197 See ACKERMAN, supra note 140, at 6-7 (1991) (“[A] dualist constitution seeks to 
distinguish between two different decisions that may be made in a democracy. The 
first is a decision by the American people; the second, by their government.”) 
 198 See KRISHNASWAMY, supra note 179, at 30 (noting that the Kesavananda court 
made an important distinction between amendment and replacement).  
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amendment by Parliament or via referendum, but not constitutional 
replacement by Constituent Assembly.199 According to the Colombian 
Court, only the people acting through a constituent assembly can 
exercise the “original constituent power” necessary to make certain 
fundamental changes to the constitutional order.200 
The theoretical defense of the unconstitutional-constitutional 
amendments doctrine therefore assumes a complete distinction 
between constitutional amendment and constitutional replacement. It 
assumes that only amendment is subject to abusive constitutional 
practices, while constitutional replacement is always carried out by the 
people themselves. These arguments have had a significant impact on 
comparative constitutional theory and practice. In academic work, it 
links back to the classical conception of constitution-making views as 
a legally uncontrolled and uncontrollable act.201 Traditional theorists 
Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes and Carl Schmitt envision constitution-
making as an act carried out by a power that is of necessity superior to 
any existing political force.202 This has become known as the theory of 
“original constituent power.” Sieyes for example writes that the 
national will is not subject to a constitution, while Schmitt argues that 
constitutions are created by acts of political will and that this will 
coexists even once constitutions have been drafted. Both theorists 
suggest a vision of what Joel Colon-Rios has called “weak 
constitutionalism” — the idea that the people have the inherent power 
to remake their constitutional order at any time, unconstrained by the 
existing political order.203 Many scholars, including Bruce Ackerman, 
have expressed dissatisfaction with the Sieyes/Schmitt view of 
 
 199 See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Octubre 19, 2005, 
Sentencia C-1040/05, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.), available 
at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2005/C-1040-05.htm. 
 200 The Colombian Constitution explicitly contemplates constitutional amendment 
or replacement by Constituent Assembly. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA 
[C.P.] art. 376. 
 201 See Landau, Constitution-Making, supra note 1, at 932. 
 202 See CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 125-26 (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., 2008); 
EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYES, WHAT IS THE THIRD ESTATE? 17 (1963). I do not mean to 
imply that these two theories are identical; some important differences are discussed 
in JOEL COLON RIOS, WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND THE 
QUESTION OF CONSTITUENT POWER 88 (2012). 
 203 See RIOS, supra note 202, at 1-2; see also Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the 
Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364, 394-96 (1995) (arguing that 
constitution-making via popular devices like constituent assemblies will produce a 
better product and allow for more deliberation in the polity). 
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constitution-making, but none have really offered a mechanism for 
restraining abusive constitutional replacement.204 
The Sieyes/Schmitt vision has also left important imprints at the 
level of both doctrine and constitutional design.205 The doctrine of 
original constituent power holds that the people retain their inherent 
right to step outside the existing constitutional order and to replace 
the constitutional text at any time. The constitutional order constrains 
the “constituted powers” set up by the text, but cannot constrain the 
“people” from remaking their constitutional order. At the level of 
constitutional design, relatively few constitutions contain any clause 
to regulate their own replacement, since replacement is seen as an act 
that takes place outside the constitutional order. Moreover, exercises 
of “original constituent power” are seen as associated with the popular 
will, and therefore devices like constituent assemblies and referenda 
are normally thought to be consistent with the doctrine. Thus, when 
constitutional replacement is regulated in constitutional texts, it is 
generally activated through the use of these devices, and can be 
regulated through popular mechanisms that are either less demanding 
or arguably no more demanding than those needed to amend the 
constitution.206 
 
 204 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 11 (1998) 
(carefully distinguishing the theory of original constituent power from his theory of 
American constitutional transformation, and asserting that the former is the point 
where “law ends, and pure politics (or war) begins”); Andrew Arato, Forms of 
Constitution-Making and Theories of Democracy, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 191, 230-31 
(1995) (rejecting a “sovereign” model of constitution-making as overly majoritarian 
and as not allowing for sequential learning). Arato has a highly-developed model of 
“post-sovereign” constitution-making that relies on roundtable discussions and 
external constraints by courts or other bodies. See ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION 
MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION 59-98 (2000). But this cooperation in his theory emerges 
endogenously and is not a product of provisions in the existing constitutional text, 
perhaps because he focuses on transitions from authoritarian regimes rather than 
constitution-making within already-democratic regimes. 
 205 Rios and Hutchinson argue that references to “constituent power” have largely 
disappeared from American constitutional theory. See Joel Colon-Rios and Allen 
Hutchinson, Democracy and Revolution: An Enduring Relationship?, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 
593, 597 (2012). The assertion is more questionable both on the level of foreign 
constitutional theory and comparative constitutional practice by courts and 
politicians, where the doctrine remains popular. For some examples of the use of the 
“original constituent power” doctrine from Latin America, see Landau, Constitution-
Making, supra note 1, at 965-66. 
 206 A striking example of this sort of vague, populist constitution-making language 
occurs in Germany, where the Basic Law was explicitly thought to be a temporary text 
to be replaced upon unification. The relevant clause states: “This Basic Law, which 
since the achievement of the unity and freedom of Germany applies to the entire 
German people, shall cease to apply on the day on which a constitution freely adopted 
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The problem is that constitutional replacement is also part of the 
toolkit of abusive constitutional regimes — by controlling the 
processes that trigger replacement or the process of constitution-
making itself, powerful figures and movements can reshape the 
constitutional order efficiently in a way that suits their interests. The 
examples drawn from Venezuela, Ecuador, and Hungary show that 
constitutional amendment and constitutional replacement are viewed 
by would-be authoritarian actors as complementary mechanisms. 
Indeed, the two tools are often deployed by political figures either as 
substitutes or as part of a common package used to entrench 
individuals or groups in power. The Ecuadorian and Venezuelan cases 
demonstrate the former pattern, where Chavez and Correa turned 
towards constitutional replacement because they would have had 
difficulty forcing amendment through accepted channels.207 The 
Hungarian case demonstrates the latter pattern — the Fidesz took 
sufficient control of Parliament to both reform and replace the 
Constitution, and used both powers strategically to entrench its own 
power and to neutralize opposition to its project.208 
Constitutional replacement, then, remains largely unregulated in 
constitutional theory and practice, and this makes it liable to abuse by 
powerful actors or groups purporting to act in the name of the people. 
The failure to regulate processes of constitutional replacement is a 
significant gap in modern constitutional theory. It might be valuable 
for constitutional texts to regulate two different types of issues: the 
conditions under which the existing constitution may be replaced, and 
the process for making a new constitution.209 This kind of 
 
by the German people takes effect.” GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK 
DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I (Ger.) art. 
146. This provision forms a startling gap in a constitutional order that otherwise 
protects itself against abusive constitutional change, both through “militant 
democracy” and unamendable provisions. See Kay, supra note 183, at 726-27; see also 
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 376 (Colom.) (allowing a Constituent 
Assembly, with undefined procedures and characteristics, to be called by a majority 
vote in Congress, followed by approval in a referendum); CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA 
REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, arts. 348-349 (Ven.) (allowing a Constituent 
Assembly replacing the Constitution to be called by either the President, two-thirds of 
Congress, two-thirds of local governments, or fifteen percent of voters).  
 207 See supra Part I.C. 
 208 See supra Part I.D.  
 209 An alternative to textual replacement clauses would be a judge-made 
unconstitutional-constitutional replacement doctrine — in other words, an 
assumption that the new constitutional text is bound by certain fundamental 
principles of the existing constitutional order, and that judges are charged with 
policing those limits. This is conceptually possible: the South African interim 
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constitutional replacement provision does not exist anywhere, 
although elements of it are present in various constitutional designs.210 
Note that my argument here does not wade into the complex 
jurisprudential debate about whether existing constitutions can as a 
theoretical matter control new constitution-making efforts, or whether 
those efforts jurisprudentially stand outside of the existing order. The 
point instead is a pragmatic one: these clauses might have sociological 
and psychological effects on the expectations of citizens, altering 
practices in useful ways by lessening the probability of a destructive 
rupture. 
Thresholds for triggering constitutional replacement might be made 
considerably higher than those for ordinary constitutional amendment 
and not, as in Hungary, equal to or less stringent than the amendment 
threshold.211 This follows from the fact that replacement is ordinarily 
more destructive of the constitutional order. And if replacement 
mechanisms are meant to be popular end-runs around existing 
institutions, then they should be difficult both to activate and to pass. 
For example, a replacement mechanism via referendum might require 
ten percent of registered voters to be placed on the ballot, and perhaps 
seventy-five percent of registered voters to be successful. This is also 
another area where temporal restrictions might be useful: voters 
could, for example, be required to vote twice in favor of authorizing a 
constituent assembly, with a gap of at least one intervening election 
separating the two votes.212 As in the constitutional amendment 
context, the use of time would be helpful to guard against 
 
constitution for example contained fundamental principles that had to be adhered to 
in the final constitutional text, and those principles were enforced by the 
Constitutional Court. See, e.g., Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making and 
its Pathology in Iraq, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 539 (2006) [hereinafter Pathology in 
Iraq] (outlining the South Africa two-stage model). The South African case was 
extraordinary in that the principles were textual rather than judge-made. A wholly 
judge-made doctrine would face severe problems from both the standpoints of 
democratic theory and practical enforceability. In Venezuela, for example, the 
Supreme Court’s attempts to make the constitution-making process comply with the 
“spirit” of the existing constitution proved ineffective. See supra text accompanying 
notes 50-54. Moreover, unlike an unconstitutional-constitutional amendments 
doctrine, an unconstitutional-constitutional replacement doctrine truly would seem to 
take away any mechanism through which a polity could carry out certain fundamental 
changes to the constitutional order. 
 210 See infra note 211. 
 211 See supra note 74 (noting that the amendment and replacement thresholds were 
identical in Hungary because the country never passed a permanent constitution after 
the democratic transition). 
 212 See supra text accompanying notes 149-150 (exploring the utility of temporal 
limitations in the constitutional amendment process). 
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constitutional replacement that is carried out merely to serve the 
interests of particular political actors or groups. 
Further, these replacement clauses could regulate the constitution-
making process itself. Constitutions could, for example, impose super-
majoritarian requirements for the votes of any constitutional assembly 
that might be called under such a provision, and might also regulate 
the electoral rules that would be used to choose such an Assembly.213 
These requirements are important because they would ensure that the 
constitution-making process could not be hijacked for majoritarian 
ends. A number of scholars have argued that majoritarian models of 
constitution-making tend to lead to poor results, and that models 
should instead seek to encourage consensus.214 
There is, of course, some risk that these clauses might be ignored. 
Constitutional replacement tends to occur at moments of political 
crisis in a polity, and at those moments legal restraints on power tend 
to be inoperative. Courts attempting to enforce restraints in those 
environments may reach the limits of their “zones of tolerance,” and 
either be ignored or shut down for issuing hostile decisions.215 But as 
already noted, political actors seeking to create hybrid regimes will 
likely be wary of disobeying clear constitutional texts; such actions 
 
 213 The new Bolivian Constitution of 2009 has a replacement clause that does a 
poor job of regulating the initiation of constitution-making, but is unusual in 
attempting to regulate the constitution-making process along the lines suggested here. 
The clause provides that an “original full-powered Constituent Assembly” may be 
initiated by twenty percent of the electorate, an absolute majority of the Legislative 
Assembly, or the President, and the proposal must be approved by referendum. 
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO (CONST. BOL.) (2009), art. 411 (Bol.). This 
structure, like that of Ecuador and Venezuela, is subject to populist manipulation by a 
strong president. See supra note 204. However, the Bolivian Constitution also provides 
that decisions of the Assembly must be taken by two-thirds majority, and then 
approved in referendum. See CONST. BOL. (2009), art. 411. This kind of provision at 
least gestures towards an effective regulation of the constitution-making process, 
although it leaves key questions unanswered (such as the electoral rules used to select 
an Assembly). A similar clause was in place when the 2009 Constitution was written, 
and it may have helped to constrain an extremely messy process somewhat, producing 
a consensus Constitution. See Landau, Constitution-Making, supra note 1, at 956-57 
(noting that the rules were threatened at various points but ultimately followed). 
 214 See, e.g., Arato, Pathology in Iraq, supra note 209, at 538-49 (arguing for a post-
sovereign model of constitution-making); Landau, Constitution-Making, supra note 1, 
at 934-38 (arguing for a model of constitutionalism that focuses on worst-case 
outcomes — breakdowns of order or slides of democracy into competitive 
authoritarian regimes); Partlett, supra note 89, at 237-38 (arguing that the Russian 
experience shows the dangers of an unrestrained constitution-making process). 
 215 See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 96 (noting that the Russian Constitutional 
Court, attempting to constrain Yeltsin during the Russian constitution-making 
process, reached the limit of its zone of tolerance and was shut down). 
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would risk falling afoul of the democracy clauses examined earlier and 
would potentially cost regimes domestic and international legitimacy. 
Clear regulation both of the conditions under which constitutional 
replacement can occur and of the process that should be followed 
during constitution-making should have at least some impact on 
restraining abusive constitutionalism. It seems probable, for example, 
that both the Fidesz in Hungary and Chavez in Venezuela would have 
abided by more demanding constitutional rules if they had existed. 
Both actors seemed wary of committing overtly illegal (as opposed to 
legally ambiguous) acts. 
A more substantial set of objections to constitutional replacement 
clauses stems from the fact there are at least three kinds of lines that 
may be difficult or impossible for such a clause to draw. First, it is 
very difficult to distinguish “genuine” exercises of the popular will 
from “false” or “manipulated” exercises. A replacement clause, in 
preventing some “inauthentic” acts of constitution-making, would 
likely also prevent some “authentic” acts. Second, as Sujit Choudry 
has argued, there are situations that constitutions cannot properly be 
understood to regulate, and yet it is very difficult to distinguish those 
situations from ones that are properly understood as within the 
existing constitutional order.216 There is a real risk that a replacement 
clause might try and over-regulate, controlling situations that are 
better dealt with outside the existing constitutional order. Finally, in a 
more pragmatic vein, there are situations where it is better to replace 
an existing constitution than maintain it. Constitutional longevity is 
not an unalloyed good. Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and James 
Melton give an obvious example — the Lebanese Constitution of 
1926, which set up a rigid power-sharing arrangement between 
Muslims and Christians that broke down as demography changed, and 
which was only resolved after a long civil war.217 Yet it would be 
difficult for a replacement clause to distinguish situations where 
replacement is unnecessary from situations where it is necessary, and 
there is a risk that a replacement clause would maintain some bad 
constitutions in place. 
 
 216 See Choudhry, supra note 141, at 229 (arguing that constitutional designers 
must realize that there are points at which constitutionalism will inevitably fail). 
Choudhry was speaking of Ackerman-style constitutional moments within a given 
constitutional order, rather than replacements of constitutions. 
 217 See TOM GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 138, at 34-35 (noting a modest preference 
in favor of constitutional stability in most circumstances, but acknowledging 
situations in which constitutions should be replaced). 
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All of these problems ought to give scholars humility before 
recommending that replacement clauses be incorporated, even if they 
do not necessarily eviscerate their value. At this point, it is sufficient 
to say that the failure to deal with the problem of constitutional 
replacement is a substantial gap in modern constitutional theory and 
design. The practices of abusive constitutionalism show how 
constitutions can be replaced opportunistically by powerful leaders in 
ways that are very destructive of the democratic order. Yet while 
theorists and courts have developed elaborate techniques and 
doctrines to control constitutional amendment, they have left 
constitutional replacement as a kind of black box. 
III. A CRITICAL REVIEW OF ESTABLISHED AND EMERGING RESPONSES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Democratic defense mechanisms are less developed in international 
law than in comparative constitutional law. It has long been noted that 
there is no full-fledged international law of democracy. Historically, 
such matters were seen as concerning internal governance, and thus 
beyond the concern of international law.218 Even after the human 
rights revolution in the post–World War II period, which has reshaped 
the way states treat their own citizens, the form of government has 
remained largely outside the scope of international law. 
Nonetheless, for several decades scholars have asserted that a 
human right to democracy is emerging, and that international law is 
no longer neutral on the question of the form of government.219 These 
scholars cobble together a number of global and regional treaties, 
declarations of the U.N. General Assembly, and other sources in 
drawing this conclusion. For example, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, while not mandating a form of government, 
includes relevant rights like the right to freedom of expression, 
association, and voting.220 Furthermore, the Outcome Document of 
 
 218 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 
AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 46 (1992) (admitting that historically matters of internal governance 
were outside the province of international law).  
 219 See, e.g., Fox & Nolte, supra note 109, at 6 (noting that “issues of domestic 
governance [are moving] from the exclusive realm of national constitutional law and 
enter[ing] the purview of international human rights law”); Franck, supra note 218 
(arguing that democracy is in the process of becoming a principle of public 
international law). 
 220 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 19, 22, 25, Mar. 
23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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the 2005 World Summit declared democracy to be a “universal 
value.”221 
My purpose here is not to critically examine this vast literature.222 
Instead, I restrict myself to examining, in section III(A), the main 
enforcement mechanism that has emerged at the regional level, the 
democracy clause.223 These type of clauses generally suspend 
membership in regional organizations or offer other sanctions to states 
experiencing “unconstitutional interruptions” in their democratic 
order or meeting other, similar conditions. These clauses may be fairly 
effective at detecting military coups and other obvious breaches in the 
democratic order, but they do not function well in combatting abusive 
constitutionalism. The mechanisms of abusive constitutionalism are 
too subtle and ambiguous to clearly trigger the clauses — for example, 
it is often unclear whether or not the action is “unconstitutional,” or 
whether the democratic order has been “interrupted.” Thus, the 
democracy clause appears to be of limited use against what is now 
emerging as the main threat to democracy. 
Section III(B) considers emerging responses, in practice or in 
scholarship, which would thicken the scope of review at the 
international level. Most radical among these is the recent Tunisian 
proposal, made before the U.N. General Assembly last year, for an 
International Constitutional Court that would act as an international 
arbiter of abusive actions. I do not dismiss these emerging possibilities 
 
 221 G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
 222 For some key contributions, see, for example, Fox & Nolte, supra note 109 
(arguing that such a right is emerging); Franck, supra note 218 (likewise). See also 
Gregory H. Fox, Democracy, Right to, International Protection, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 35-36 (2012), available at http:// 
www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-
e773&recno=1&author=Fox%20%20Gregory%20H (concluding that a right continues 
to emerge but is hampered over disagreement about the definition of democracy and 
because of regional differences); Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, Introduction: The 
Spread of Liberal Democracy and its Implications for International Law, in DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 2 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) 
(“[I]t is now clear that international law and international organizations are no longer 
indifferent to the internal character of regimes exercising effective control within 
‘sovereign’ States.”); Marks, supra note 17, at 522-24 (arguing that the idea of such an 
entitlement remains unsettled and problematic in international law). 
 223 I do not engage the controversial question of pro-democratic intervention. See, 
e.g., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & George Downs, Intervention and Democracy, 60 INT’L 
ORG. 627, 647 (2006) (finding empirical data that democratic intervention is rarely 
likely to make a positive contribution); Simone van den Driest, Pro-Democratic 
Intervention and the Right to Political Self-Determination: The Case of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, 57 NED. INT’L L. REV. 29, 46-48 (2010) (arguing that democratic intervention 
endangers international rights to self-determination). 
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out of hand, but I do point out the great difficulties involved in 
making them effective against abusive constitutionalism. 
A. Democracy Clauses 
In the Americas, as in Africa, and under documents governing the 
Commonwealth countries, a major mechanism of enforcement is the 
so-called “democracy clause.”224 These clauses provide that under 
certain circumstances, a transition from a democratic to a non-
democratic regime will be punished by international actors in the 
region. The Latin American version of the clause provides that a 
country may be suspended from the Organization of American States 
(“OAS”) if its “democratically constituted government has been 
overthrown by force.”225 Other relevant documents in the OAS system 
provide for suspension in the event of an “unconstitutional 
interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration 
of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic 
order in a member state.”226 The clause contained in the Charter of the 
African Union similarly states that “[g]overnments which shall come 
to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to 
participate in the activities of the Union,” and provides for sets of 
sanctions against those regimes.227 Finally, the Commonwealth version 
of the clause is triggered “particularly in the event of an 
unconstitutional overthrow of a democratically elected government,” 
and lays out a similar regime of sanctions.228 There is no doubt that 
coups have fallen sharply in the historically coup-plagued regions 
adopting these clauses, as they have worldwide.229 It is, however, 
 
 224 For a general discussion, see, for example, Theodore J. Piccone, International 
Mechanisms for Protecting Democracy, in PROTECTING DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSES 101, 101 (Morton H. Halperin & Mirna Galic eds., 2005). 
 225 Charter of the Organization of American States art. 9, Dec. 13, 1951, 119 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 226 Inter-American Democratic Charter art. 19, Sept. 11, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 1289, 
available at http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm. Note that the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter, while approved by the General Assembly of the 
OAS, is not itself a treaty and thus has an uncertain status under international law. 
See, e.g., Piccone, supra note 224, at 105 (noting that the Charter is not a treaty but “is 
another step forward towards devising an inter-American system for preventing and 
responding to breakdowns in democratic governance”). 
 227 Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 30, July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3.  
 228 Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme on the Harare Declaration art. 3, 
Nov. 1995, available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Templates/Internal.asp? 
NodeID=35800. 
 229 See CENTER FOR SYSTEMATIC PEACE, POLITY IV: REGIME AUTHORITY 
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difficult to tell whether the drop is caused by these clauses or by 
broader changes in political and social attitudes.230 
My point here is that however effective these clauses might be at 
deterring or punishing coups, they are much harder to invoke against 
the kinds of abusive constitutional actions surveyed in Part I. The 
main reason is because these clauses generally require 
“unconstitutional” action, and often further that the action 
“interrupt[s]” or “overthrows” a democratic government or order. It is 
often possible to gain a consensus that these conditions have been met 
with respect to a classic military coup. But it is far more difficult with 
respect to an incumbent government taking abusive constitutional 
action to weaken the democratic order. Sometimes these actions will 
appear to be clearly constitutional; in most other cases 
constitutionality is at least ambiguous. Further, these types of actions 
by incumbent governments may not seem to “overthrow” or 
“interrupt” a democratic order, since the same incumbents tend to 
continue in government. 
A recent example of abusive constitutionalism highlights the point: 
the invocation of the OAS democracy clause in Honduras.231 The 
illuminating thing about the Honduran incident is that it involved two 
clear dangers to democracy: the abusive constitutional maneuvers of 
then-incumbent President Manuel Zelaya, who sought to entrench 
himself in power by replacing the existing constitution and likely by 
removing term limits, and the military’s removal of Zelaya from power 
 
CHARACTERISTICS AND TRANSITIONS DATASETS: COUPS D’ ETAT, 1946–2011, available at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm (finding a steady drop in the frequency 
of coups since the 1960s).  
 230 For a study concluding that the African clause did indeed deter a number of 
coups, see Jonathan Powell & Trace Lasley, Constitutional Norms and the Decline of 
the Coup d’ Etat: An Empirical Assessment 19, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the Southern Political Science Association (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author), available at http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/ 
5/4/4/3/0/p544304_index.html?phpsessid=995ab0d34f7dde965dabbc7730edeb67. 
 231 The Honduran example has been extensively discussed in recent work. See, e.g., 
Albert, Handcuffs, supra note 142, at 690-93 (arguing that the complete 
unamendability of the presidential reelection provision contributed to the crisis); 
Rosalind Dixon & Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutions Inside Out: Outsider Interventions in 
Domestic Constitutional Contests, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 149, 159 (2013) (viewing 
the Honduras affair as an example of the growing phenomenon of extra-territorial 
constitutional interpretation). The author served as part of a team of academics 
consulting for the Honduran Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, and 
evaluating the legality of the actions both of President Zelaya and of those who 
removed him from power. The report was issued in 2011. See Feldman, Landau, 
Sheppard & Rosa-Suazo, supra note 5, at 8. 
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and from the country.232 Yet only the second action (which was viewed 
by the international community as a clear “coup”) was perceived as a 
danger to democracy, even though it was far from clear that it was the 
more significant of the two threats. 
Manuel Zelaya was elected president in 2006 as a member of one of 
the country’s two major parties, but alienated both the opposition 
party and elements of his own party as he pursued an increasingly 
populist agenda and turned towards Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. Zelaya 
joined regional economic and foreign policy organizations created by 
Chavez and criticized the existing political parties as corrupt and 
illegitimate.233 The charge rang true in Honduras’ impoverished and 
highly unequal economy, but it started to distance Zelaya from even 
some members of his own party. Moreover, in 2008 Zelaya began to 
take steps to replace the existing constitution. Following a playbook 
that was similar to those already used in Venezuela, Bolivia, and 
Ecuador, he argued that the existing text was discredited and obsolete, 
and thus needed to be replaced with an updated text written at a new 
constituent assembly.234 He was never particularly forthcoming about 
what his plans for the new text were, but numerous commentators and 
people around Zelaya suggested that at least one key purpose of the 
Assembly would be to give Zelaya a second term in office.235 
As in many cases involving abusive constitutionalism, the legality of 
the steps pursued by Zelaya was unclear. The root problem is that the 
Honduran Constitution, like most constitutions, has provisions for 
 
 232 I do not mean to imply that the democracy clause is the only mechanism in the 
Americas that is designed to protect democracy. As has been detailed elsewhere, the 
system also includes other mechanisms, especially Electoral Observation missions, 
undertaken with the consent of a given country. See, e.g., Ruben M. Perina, The Role of 
the Organization of American States, in PROTECTING DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSES 127, 145 (Morton H. Halperin & Mirna Galic eds., 2005) (stating that 
electoral observation missions are “one of the primary and most visible activities” of 
the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy of the OAS). However, these mechanisms 
also often prove problematic when dealing with competitive authoritarian regimes. 
While such regimes may appear to have free and fair elections on the day of the 
election itself, incumbents stack the deck between elections by controlling media, 
financing, and other resources. See Steven Levitsky & Lucan Way, Why Democracy 
Needs a Level Playing Field, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2010, at 58-60. 
 233 See Feldman, Landau, Sheppard & Rosa-Suazo, supra note 5, at 10 (recounting 
Zelaya’s efforts to join Petro Caribe and the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of 
Our America, both organizations controlled by Chavez).  
 234 See Buscan crear vacío de poder en Honduras, EL HERALDO (Hon.) (Jan. 17, 
2009), http://archivo.elheraldo.hn/content/view/full/69737.  
 235 See id.  
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amendment but not replacement.236 The text does not discuss the 
conditions under which the existing Honduran constitutional order 
may be replaced. Moreover, the Honduran Constitution contains 
certain provisions that are alleged to be unamendable by any method 
(the so-called “petrified” articles): one such provision limits presidents 
to only one term in office.237 This added an additional layer of 
complexity, because even if replacement per se would be 
constitutional, it is possible that it would be found unconstitutional to 
the extent that it amended the “petrified” clauses.238 
At any rate, an administrative court issued a decision and several 
subsequent orders requiring Zelaya to desist from carrying out the 
non-binding referendum; appeals against this order to the Supreme 
Court were not successful.239 Zelaya claimed that these orders were 
themselves illegal, and pushed forward with his plans for a non-
binding referendum. Several days before the vote was to have been 
held, his supporters broke into a military base and took ballots and 
other materials needed to hold the vote.240 The OAS did not threaten 
Zelaya under its democracy clause. Instead, the organization’s 
Secretary General agreed — at Zelaya’s invitation — to send an 
 
 236 The relevant amendment provision provides that amendment may be 
undertaken by a two-thirds vote in two consecutive ordinary sessions of the National 
Congress. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS (CONST. HOND.), 
art. 373 (Hond.). 
 237 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS (CONST. HOND.), art. 
374 (Hond.) (“The prior article, the present one, the articles referring to the form of 
government, the national territory, the presidential term, the prohibition on again 
being President of the Republic by any citizen who has exercised it under any title, 
and the reference to those who cannot be President of the Republic in the following 
period may not be reformed.”); see also id. art. 239 (“The citizen who has exercised 
the Executive Power may not be elected President or Vice-President of the Republic. 
He who breaks this disposition or proposes its reform, along with those who support 
him directly or indirectly, will immediately cease in the enjoyment of their respective 
charges and will remain ineligible for ten years from exercising any public function.”). 
 238 Further, the steps proposed by Zelaya included few guarantees of a fair process. 
For example, rather than having the Supreme Electoral Tribunal supervise a 
supposedly non-binding referendum on whether to go forward with the Constituent 
Assembly, as was customary for all national elections, Zelaya’s decree purported to put 
supervision in the hands of the military and vote counting in the hands of the agency 
that conducted the census. See Feldman, Landau, Sheppard & Rosa-Suazo, supra note 
5, at 32-35. 
 239 See id. at 25-28. 
 240 ‘Mel’ empieza a quedarse sin respaldo, EL HERALDO (Hon.) (June 26, 2009), 
http://archivo.elheraldo.hn/content/view/full/156725. 
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“Accompaniment Mission” to “witness” the polls on the day of his 
vote.241 
Two days before the vote, on the morning of June 28, 2009, various 
high-ranking members of the military entered the presidential palace 
and told Zelaya that he had to come with them — he was put on a 
plane and flown to Costa Rica, where he later held a press conference, 
still in his pajamas.242 The military claimed to have detained Zelaya on 
the authority of an arrest warrant issued by the Supreme Court, 
although the warrant ordered Zelaya taken in front of the Court and 
not removed from the country.243 Later that day, the Congress met, 
purporting by wide majorities to “separate” Zelaya from his post and 
to appoint a replacement to serve out the rest of his term, the then-
President of Congress Roberto Michelleti.244 
The international reaction to the removal of Zelaya, particularly at 
the OAS, was fiercely negative. The incident was referred to as a 
“coup” by virtually everyone in the region, and all actors called for 
Zelaya to be reinstated in his office.245 After some short-lived 
diplomatic efforts by the Secretary-General of the OAS failed, the 
organization suspended Honduras under the anti-coup clause, with all 
thirty-three member states voting in favor of the suspension.246 The 
resolution referred to the removal of Zelaya as a “coup d’état” and 
found that it constituted an “unconstitutional interruption of the 
 
 241 Note that the Secretary General referred to this mission as an “accompaniment 
mission” rather than as a mission of “electoral observers.” See HUMAN RIGHTS 
FOUNDATION, THE FACTS AND THE LAW BEHIND THE DEMOCRATIC CRISIS OF HONDURAS, 
2009: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY LAW ANALYSIS 109-10 (2010), 
http://www.thehrf.com/HRF_TheFactsAndTheLaw_Honduras2009.pdf. 
 242 Michelleti sucede a ‘Mel,’ LA TRIBUNA (Hon.) (June 29, 2009), available at 
http://old.latribuna.hn/2009/06/29/micheletti-sucede-a-”mel”/. 
 243 See id. 
 244 This congressional action was potentially problematic, because the Constitution 
contained no provision allowing for congressional removal of the president or of other 
officials. Only the Supreme Court, after criminal trial, had a clear power to remove a 
president. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS (CONST. HOND.), art. 
313, cl. 2 (Hon.).  
 245 See UN Backs Honduras Leader’s Return, BBC NEWS (June 30, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8127503.stm (collecting condemnations issued by 
government agencies, by the OAS, and by the United Nations General Assembly); see 
also INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HONDURAS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
THE COUP D’ ETAT 1 (2009) (concluding that the events in Honduras constituted a 
“coup”), available at http://www.cidh.org/pdf%20files/HONDURAS2009ENG.pdf. 
 246 See Ginger Thompson & Marc Lacey, O.A.S. Votes to Suspend Honduras Over 
Coup, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/05/world/americas/ 
05honduras.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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democratic order” under the democracy clause.247 Many major 
countries sanctioned Honduras, including aid cutoffs from both the 
United States and the European Union.248 The suspension was not 
lifted until two years later, after Honduras had had an intervening 
election.249 
The Honduras incident is illustrative for showing the weaknesses of 
democracy clauses as applied to abusive constitutionalism. The 
military’s removal of Zelaya triggered a strong response under the 
democracy clause because it replaced a democratic government in 
flagrant violation of constitutional norms.250 It brought back memories 
of the military governments of the 1970s and 1980s, and thus 
provoked a strong reaction from the region. In contrast, the actions of 
Zelaya were difficult to shoe-horn under the clause. The 
constitutionality of many of his actions appeared to rest on delicate 
constitutional judgments, and there was no single point where the 
constitutional order appeared to have been “interrupted” or 
“suspended.” 
Nonetheless, the threat posed by Zelaya to the democratic order was 
fairly serious. While the military did remove Zelaya from power in 
obvious violation of constitutional norms, it showed no interest in 
governing, instead turning over power to the President of Congress. 
Zelaya, in contrast, seemed poised to take unilateral action to replace 
the existing constitution, against the wishes of the other branches of 
government. While his concrete plans for the new constitutional order 
were unclear, there were obvious examples from other recent 
constitution-making experiences in neighboring countries — 
 
 247 See ORG. AM. STATES, Press Release, Organization of American States, OAS 
Suspends Membership of Honduras (July 5, 2009), http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/ 
press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-219/09. 
 248 See PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RES. SERV., HONDURAN-U.S. RELATIONS 16 (2013), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34027.pdf. 
 249 See OAS Lifts Honduras Suspension After Zelaya Agreement, BBC NEWS (June 1, 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13622939. 
 250 Few actors seriously contended, for example, that the military’s removal of 
Zelaya was constitutional. However, the legality of certain actions surrounding the 
removal has been more controversial. Actors have taken both sides of the question on 
the issue of whether congress had the power to “separate” Zelaya from office. Compare 
Feldman, Landau, Sheppard & Rosa-Suazo, supra note 5, at 57-61 (concluding that 
the attempt was unconstitutional), and HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, supra note 241 
(same), with Dixon & Jackson, supra note 231, at 174-80 (noting the disagreement in 
evaluations of the congressional action), and Frank M. Walsh, The Honduran 
Constitution is not a Suicide Pact: The Legality of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya’s 
Removal, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 339 (2010) (concluding that removal power could 
be implied under the circumstances). 
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Venezuela and Ecuador — that the replacement process could be used 
to greatly entrench the power of an incumbent president and to 
disable competing institutions. The differential response of 
international regional institutions to Zelaya and to the regime that 
replaced him did not make sense from the standpoint of democracy 
promotion.251 
B. Emerging and Proposed Responses at the International Level: 
Towards a Global Constitutional Court? 
Can the democracy clause be improved or rewritten to deal more 
effectively with abusive constitutional practices, or is a more effective 
alternative regime possible? These questions are important because 
they will determine how much of a role international law can have in 
preventing the emergence of competitive authoritarian regimes in the 
future. A full answer to this question is, most likely, an article unto 
itself. But I can offer some tentative suggestions about the route that 
such improvement might take. 
One possibility would be to enforce the existing clauses more 
rigorously, so that they catch not only blatant constitutional ruptures 
like military coups, but also more ambiguous constitutional violations 
by incumbent governments, such as those undertaken in Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Honduras.252 This path should probably be rejected. 
Many acts of abusive constitutionalism — for example, those in 
Hungary — seem unambiguously to follow prevailing constitutional 
norms. And for those that are ambiguous, a declaration by 
international actors that the action was in fact “unconstitutional” 
would require difficult and controversial constitutional judgments by 
“outsiders” to the constitutional order. 
As Vicki Jackson and Rosalind Dixon have recently argued, this 
kind of “extra-territorial constitutional interpretation” seems 
problematic, especially when taken in controversial cases and when 
used coercively.253 A good example is offered by recent events in 
 
 251 This is not to say that the OAS was unwarranted in sanctioning the removal. 
There are still likely good reasons to sanction military interventions in politics. 
Moreover, the action destabilized the country and led to some human rights abuses. 
See, e.g., INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 245 (detailing the 
use of states of exception and collecting evidence of human rights abuses). 
 252 See Piccone, supra note 224, at 122-23 (arguing that the clauses could be 
utilized to cover cases of “democratic erosion” as well as sharp ruptures of the 
democratic order such as coups). 
 253 See Dixon & Jackson, supra note 231, at 154-56 (developing the concept of 
“extra-territorial” constitutional interpretation).  
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Paraguay, where many Latin American countries suggested again 
invoking the OAS democracy clause after an incumbent president was 
impeached.254 The impeachment received the requisite number of 
congressional votes, but occurred extremely quickly, leading many in 
the international community to label it a “parliamentary coup” that 
lacked the requisite “due process.”255 But since the Paraguayan 
Constitution fails to spell out what kind of due process is required for 
impeachment, or even whether any due process is required, such a 
judgment would require delicate constitutional judgments by 
international institutions with no particular knowledge of Paraguayan 
constitutional law. It seems doubtful that those judgments are either 
feasible or desirable, and such interventions would likely be taken for 
political purposes rather than with the effect of improving 
democracy.256 
A second possibility would be to provide for specific constitutional 
“recipes” across countries — requiring, for example, that constitutions 
include certain elements such as ombudsmen, constitutional courts, 
etc. This “thickened” conception of democracy also seems unlikely to 
work in practice. It would require a consensus on constitutional 
design that does not appear to exist in most parts of the world.257 More 
fundamentally, abusive constitutionalist practices can work by 
constructing constitutions that seem democratic in their individual 
parts, but are authoritarian in their overall interaction or in the ways 
in which institutions function in practice. Checking institutions like 
courts or ombudsmen exist in all of these regimes; they are simply 
packed or otherwise rendered ineffective. Kim Lane Scheppele has 
recently labeled the new Hungarian state a “Frankenstate” — 
democratic-seeming in its individual details, but with a monstrous 
overall effect.258 A constitutional order could easily be devised that 
 
 254 See Paraguay: President Impeached, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2012), http://www. 
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 255 See Lugo Denounces Removal from Paraguay Presidency as Coup, BBC NEWS (June 
24, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-18569378. 
 256 See Stephen Schnably, Emerging International Law Constraints on Constitutional 
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 257 See Schnably, Constitutionalism, supra note 18, at 198 (arguing that 
“[c]onstitutional design is too fluid, too tied to each country’s own history, culture, 
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 258 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Not Your Father’s Authoritarianism: The Creation of the 
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would meet any checklist of individual institutional elements while 
being authoritarian in practice. 
A third, and potentially more effective, possibility may be 
developing out of the current Hungarian mess. The European Union, 
as noted in Part I, has had a slow and partially ineffective response in 
Hungary. Actors must go through rigorous reviews of their 
institutional order to be admitted to the Union, but once admitted 
they are no longer subject to these sorts of “thick” reviews.259 As a 
result, the Union has had to rig together a set of responses from tools, 
like infringement actions in front of the European Court of Justice, 
which were created for other ends. But Europeans are now considering 
creating an institution that would carry out “thick” periodic reviews of 
the constitutional order of all European states to ensure that they 
actually are functioning as liberal democracies.260 Non-compliant 
states would be subject to adverse action by the Union. Theoretically, 
such an approach should prove superior to the other two at detecting 
abusive constitutionalism, because it allows space for exactly the kinds 
of complex analysis needed to identify and analyze it. Still, it is unclear 
whether a consensus exists to create such an institution within the 
European Union; the prospects in other regions are much grimmer in 
the short term. 
The boldest of all the proposals is the recent call for an International 
Constitutional Court.261 In the midst of the complex democratic 
advances and retrogressions of the Arab Spring, interim Tunisian 
President Moncef Marzouki argued that such a Court would be useful 
precisely as a protection against abusive constitutionalism. As he 
stated in his speech before the U.N. General Assembly, “dictatorships 
g[i]ve themselves a ‘false legality’ by organizing fraudulent elections 
and using democratic principles to undermine democracy itself.”262 
 
 259 The initial reviews are referred to as the Copenhagen Criteria. See ECONOMIC 
ACCESSION CRITERIA, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/enlargement/ 
criteria/index_en.htm. 
 260 See Scheppele, supra note 258, at 8. Note that the Venice Commission does 
periodically offer opinions on various aspects of the legal and constitutional orders of 
the Eastern European states, and has issued numerous opinions on the new Hungarian 
constitutional order. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. But the 
Commission’s views have no legal effect, and it is part of the Council of Europe 
system (which includes the European Court of Human Rights), rather than the 
European Union. 
 261 See, e.g., Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, International 
Constitutional Court Proposed to Protect Democracy (May 4, 2013), http://www.idea.int/ 
wana/international-constitutional-court-proposed-to-protect-democracy.cfm (introducing 
and evaluating the idea). 
 262 U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., 12th, 13th, & 14th mtgs. (Sept. 27, 2012), available at 
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The Court would be empowered to combat these abuses by, for 
example, “denounce[ing] certain constitutions or illegal charters or 
illegal or fraudulent elections.”263 
This proposal is provocative and potentially important in starting a 
productive dialogue at the international level. The analysis carried out 
in this Article suggests important questions. What body of law would 
such a court apply? On the one hand, there appears to be no 
developed body of international law on the topic, and the emergence 
of a thick enough consensus on the content of democratic institutions 
is still a long way off, even within most regions. On the other hand, if 
the court would be charged primarily with applying the domestic law 
of the state at issue, then it would raise the same problems faced by 
democracy clauses. Acts of abusive constitutionalism do not flagrantly 
violate the constitutional text, and international bodies have suspect 
legitimacy to undertake final interpretations of ambiguous points from 
a domestic constitutional order.264 So it is likely that such a court 
would only be able to weed out flagrant violations of the constitutional 
order — badly rigged elections, for example — and not to deal with 
the subtler exercises of abusive constitutionalism surveyed in this 
Article. 
Further, a commission or similar body may be the appropriate 
institutional form, rather than a court. The pressing task is not to 
determine whether a particular action was legal or illegal within the 
domestic constitutional order, or even whether a particular kind of 
institution — such as a constitutional court or impartial electoral 
commission — is present or missing from that order. It is instead to 
determine whether the order as a whole complies with certain basic 
principles that make it adequately democratic, and whether a given 
episode of political or constitutional change has made the regime 
markedly less democratic than it was previously. This is a task that 
might conceivably be undertaken by a global equivalent of the Venice 
Commission wielding a set of soft norms, but it is difficult to see how 
it could be carried out by an International Constitutional Court.265 
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 265 See supra text accompanying notes 257–259 (discussing the possible creation of 
an institution in Europe to carry out periodic reviews of the democratic orders of 
European states, in the wake of the problems in Hungary). 
  
2013] Abusive Constitutionalism 259 
CONCLUSION: AN IMPOSSIBLE AGENDA FOR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY? 
My main purpose in this Article has been conceptual and 
descriptive. I have argued that the undermining of democracy through 
the use of the tools of constitutional change is likely to be increasingly 
common in the future, and that we have few adequate responses in 
comparative and international law. 
The next question is obvious: can we develop more effective 
responses at either the domestic or international level? An honest 
answer must express some recognition of the difficulty of the task. As 
the examples here have shown, abusive constitutional practices can 
proceed through a variety of different routes to achieve the same goals 
— constitutional replacement can be used if constitutional 
amendment attempts are stymied, and would-be authoritarians can 
resort to undermining a number of different institutions, in a number 
of different ways, to achieve their goals. The Hungarian example is 
perhaps the best example of this fungibility problem: the Fidesz 
amended and then replaced the Constitution, and it has used a 
number of different techniques, both constitutional and legal, to 
undermine the power of checking institutions and to entrench the 
party’s power.266 For example, the Fidesz has undermined the 
judiciary by changing the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, by 
expanding the size of the court and then packing it, by altering the 
retirement age for ordinary judges, and by controlling the institution 
with power over ordinary judicial appointments.267 Finding effective 
responses to this kind of structural undermining is a complex 
undertaking. 
Still, the importance of the practice of abusive constitutionalism 
may help to reorient some of the key questions in the field. For 
example, recent scholarship has focused largely on multiethnic 
polities, which are seen as more likely to face a variety of ills, 
including violence and democratic overthrow.268 But the problem of 
abusive constitutionalism seems more likely to crop up in relatively 
homogenous polities, where vote counts tend to be more unstable and 
political parties often less rooted.269 The problem of abusive 
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constitutionalism thus suggests a broad agenda on the design of 
institutions and elections for scholars working on relatively 
homogenous states. 
Further, the problem of abusive constitutionalism reinforces a key 
point: the formal rules embodied in constitutions are often stunningly 
weak, and even perceivably strong rules can be captured in a 
surprisingly high number of circumstances. The trick, of course, is 
preserving constitutionalism in the face of this reality. In part, the 
answers lie in constructing a more intricate formal system of 
constitutional change: this is what amendment tiers or replacement 
clauses do. But perhaps more significantly, the answer lies in 
developing a different conception of constitutionalism altogether. The 
doctrine of unconstitutional-constitutional amendments, and perhaps 
the emerging European responses to Hungary, suggest a more 
substantive conception of constitutionalism — one that states that a 
constitution is not really constitutional unless it actually works in 
certain ways and adheres to certain fundamental principles. The 
emerging shape of these doctrines, and the distribution of authority 
between domestic and international interpreters, will be a major focus 
of the “global dialogue” of constitutional judges and scholars in 
coming years. 
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